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BITING THE D.V. BULLET: ARE DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE 
RESTRAINING ORDERS TRAMPLING ON SECOND 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS? 
Peter Slocum∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December of 2005, Colleen Nestler convinced a New Mexico 
court to file a restraining order against David Letterman because she 
claimed that his presence on television harassed her.
1
  Although the 
issuing court later dismissed its own outrageous protective order,
2
 Mr. 
Letterman was placed on a national register of domestic abusers.
3
  He 
was prohibited from either directly or indirectly contacting the al-
leged victim (whom he had never met) and would have been subject 
to criminal prosecution for any violation.
4
  Federal law required the 
television host to forfeit any firearms that he may have owned.
5
  If he 
had come into possession of a weapon while this order was still out-
standing, he could have gone to prison.
6
 
While many people consider domestic-violence restraining or-
ders important tools for combating abuse, the above example illu-
strates that they may be subject to inappropriate applications.  This 
Comment examines the implications of the Second Amendment to 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Rutgers 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Thomas Healy, Jamie Gottlieb, and Ashley 
Ochs for their invaluable guidance and assistance with the development of this 
Comment. 
 1 Gregory A. Hession, Restraining Orders Out of Control, NEW AM., Aug. 4, 2008, at 
12, 12, available at http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/173-restraining-
orders-out-of-control.  David Letterman is a late-night television-show host.  Id.   
 2 Id. at 13.  
 3 Id. at 12.  The register is the Protection Order File of the National Criminal 
Information Center, which is maintained by the Criminal Justice Information Servic-
es Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
NCIC National Crime Information Center, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ 
ncic_brochure.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).    
 4 Hession, supra note 1, at 12. 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).  
 6 See id. § 924(a)(1) (providing that violation of § 922(g) is punishable by up to 
five years in prison). 
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the U.S. Constitution in state domestic-violence restraining orders.  
Focusing on the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act,
7
 
this Comment argues that because of the laxity of the statute, the po-
tential for abuse by plaintiffs, and the expansive provisions limiting 
gun ownership, the current law is overbroad and thereby infringes on 
defendants’ right to bear arms.
8
 
In June of 2008, a New Jersey Chancery Division judge found 
that the state’s domestic-violence statute violated both the state and 
federal constitutions in Crespo v. Crespo.
9
  Although the defendant had 
argued that the statute also violated his Second Amendment rights, 
the judge rejected this argument because no protection for weapon 
ownership exists in New Jersey.
10
  Less than two weeks later, the Su-
preme Court of the United States declared in District of Columbia v. 
Heller that the Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to 
bear arms and thereby rejected the longstanding “militia right” 
theory.
11
  This landmark decision will no doubt lead to renewed scru-
tiny of many laws, both at the state and federal level.  Domestic-
violence legislation is a prime example of statutes that require such 
analysis. 
Part II of this Comment explains how state domestic-violence 
laws implicate the Second Amendment and ultimately assumes incor-
poration of the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It provides a general background on the customary fea-
tures of state restraining-order statutes as they exist across the coun-
try.  It then focuses specifically on New Jersey’s domestic-violence sta-
tute and sets forth detailed background information on the law along 
with specific precedent as to how the courts have interpreted the sta-
tute.  Part II then examines how the state’s statute interacts with oth-
 
 7 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17 to -34 (West 2005).   
 8 See U.S. CONST. amend. II.   
 9 Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
June 18, 2008), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/crespo_decision.pdf 
(finding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers rules set forth in the New 
Jersey Constitution as well as the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution), rev’d, 
972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2009). 
 10 Id. at 11; see also Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968).  New Jersey is 
one of only seven states that does not provide for gun-ownership rights in its state 
constitution.  Roland H. Beason, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It Is Time to 
Protect the Right of the Individual to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 561, 580 (1999) 
(citing David B. Kopel, Rational Basis of “Assault Weapon” Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 
381, 382 (1994)).   
 11 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008); see also infra Part II.A.    
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er laws, both at the state and at the federal level.  Last, it looks at how 
courts apply the statute in practice and the sorts of external factors 
that play a role in the administration of the law. 
Part III analyzes New Jersey’s statute in light of Heller.  It con-
cludes that a “rational basis” review for Second Amendment chal-
lenges is unlikely and assumes an “intermediate scrutiny” review as 
the lowest plausible standard.  This Part then applies that standard of 
review to New Jersey’s statute and concludes that it would fail a con-
stitutional challenge for being overly broad.  Finally, Part IV recom-
mends revisions to New Jersey’s statute so that the needs of victims of 
domestic violence can be balanced properly against the constitutional 
rights of defendants.  This Comment proposes five specific alterations 
and discusses how each would make the law less vulnerable to Second 
Amendment criticism while still affording victims of domestic vi-
olence ample legal protection. 
II. LAWS AFFECTING THE FIREARMS RIGHTS OF  
DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE DEFENDANTS 
New Jersey passed the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 
1991 to address the problem of violence in domestic relations.
12
  
Since that time, numerous laws have emerged, at both the state and 
federal level, which create an intricate web of legislation that simul-
taneously creates tempting causes of action for plaintiffs and provides 
stiff penalties for defendants.
13
  To properly analyze the constitutio-
nality of New Jersey’s statute, it is necessary to set forth the law in this 
area generally so as to see the interplay that exists. 
A. Implication of the Second Amendment 
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that 
“[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be in-
fringed.”
14
  For most of the past century, lower courts had interpreted 
the amendment as referring to a collective right held by the militias 
of the several states,
15
 thereby excluding individuals from the concept 
 
 12 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005).   
 13 See infra Part II.C.2.   
 14 U.S. CONST. amend. II.   
 15 See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Baer, 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 
1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 1997); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995). 
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of “the people” as used in the Second Amendment.  While some low-
er courts concluded otherwise,
16
 the consensus among the majority of 
the circuits and states (at least among those that had taken part in the 
analysis) was that individuals had no right to bear arms.
17
  In a 2008 
decision, District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court reversed 
that longstanding interpretation and declared that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.
18
  As the par-
ticular law that the Court was analyzing was not from a state but ra-
ther from the District of Columbia, the Court had no need to consid-
er the issue of incorporation of the Second Amendment against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Currently, the courts have yet to incorporate against the states 
only four of the liberties protected by the first eight amendments in 
the Bill of Rights: the restriction on quartering soldiers, the right to a 
civil jury, the right to a grand jury, and the Second Amendment’s 
right to bear arms.
19
  Courts that had previously addressed the possi-
ble incorporation of the Second Amendment did so under the guise 
of the “militia right” theory and found that incorporation was unne-
cessary for a freedom that did not concern individual liberties.
20
  Be-
cause of the dramatic shift in the basic understanding of this pro-
tected right after Heller, however, those older cases will likely be of 
little, if any, precedential value to future courts.  Indeed, some lower 
courts have already decided to incorporate the Second Amendment 
in the wake of Heller.
21
 
In NRA v. City of Chicago, decided after Heller, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted the issue of whether to 
incorporate the Second Amendment against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
  The Seventh 
Circuit declined to incorporate the right to bear arms and stated that 
the issue was “for the Justices rather than a court of appeals.”
23
  The 
 
 16 See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001).   
 17 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.   
 18 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).   
 19 Beason, supra note 10, at 571–72. 
 20 See, e.g., Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982); 
United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).   
 21 See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted, 575 
F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).     
 22 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009).   
 23 Id. at 860.   
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Supreme Court accepted the petition for certiorari in this case, and a 
decision is still pending as this Comment goes to print.
24
 
The five-Justice majority that decided Heller is still on the Court 
at the time of this publication.
25
  These are the same Justices who 
stated, “By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had be-
come fundamental for English subjects.”
26
  Whether a given right is 
“fundamental—whether, that is, [it] is necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty” has been cited by the Court as 
one basis on which to incorporate a constitutional right.
27
  This 
Comment thus subscribes to the view that incorporation is appropri-
ate but will go no further to make arguments in this regard.
28
  Accor-
dingly, this Comment assumes incorporation and proceeds with an 
analysis of domestic-violence restraining orders in light of Second 
Amendment rights.
29
 
 
 24 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).   
 25 See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.   
 26 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2798 (2008). 
 27 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial).  A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently cited this exact language in deciding that the Second Amendment should be 
incorporated against the states.  Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 449 (9th Cir. 2009).  
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently ordered an en banc rehearing of the case.  Nor-
dyke v. King, 575 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2009).      
 28 For a specific argument as to why the courts should incorporate the Second 
Amendment against the states, see generally Beason, supra note 10.  For a discussion 
on incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992).   
 29 Notably, incorporation, while being the most direct way of attacking the validi-
ty of state restraining orders under the Second Amendment, is not the only way of 
implicating federal constitutional protections against state orders.  For example, 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006) prohibits individuals with state restraining orders filed 
against them from possessing firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce.  
Some courts have already discussed Second Amendment issues with regard to state 
orders through this federal statute.  See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 
261–62 (5th Cir. 2001).  Additionally, the federal Prevention of Violence Against 
Women Act requires all states and federal territories to give full faith and credit to all 
provisions of restraining orders issued by the states.  18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2006).  Thus a 
state restraining order prohibiting a defendant from owning a firearm in the District 
of Columbia might implicate the Second Amendment.  This Comment does not ad-
dress alternative scenarios, however, because it assumes incorporation.      
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B. Restraining Orders in the States 
All fifty states have their own domestic-violence statutes and each 
permits the filing of restraining orders against the alleged abuser by 
the plaintiff-victim.
30
  While each law is unique, many features are 
common to all such statutes. 
As a general matter, the plaintiff-victim files with the court a pe-
tition for relief alleging that the defendant committed acts of domes-
tic abuse.
31
  An affidavit or other sworn statement accompanies the 
petition.
32
  In the majority of jurisdictions, these statutes permit the 
judge to enter an emergency protective order ex parte the very same 
day without the defendant even being aware that proceedings are 
happening.
33
  After the defendant receives notice, the court will hold 
a summary hearing within a few days or weeks to decide whether to 
make the restraining order final.
34
  At the hearing the plaintiff nor-
 
 30 See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
domviol/docs/DV_CPO_Chart_8_2007.pdf.  For a basic discussion on the policy ar-
guments underlying civil restraining orders, see generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiv-
ing Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without End-
ing the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008); Emily J. Sack, Battered Women 
and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657.  
For a discussion specific to New Jersey’s statute, see generally Maura Beth Johnson, 
Note, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, 17 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234 (1993).    
 31 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(a) (West, Westlaw through 2009); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1) (LEXIS through 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.2950(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-3 
(LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.). 
 32 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.020 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.710(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-253.1(A) (LEXIS through 2009 Special Sess. I); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-
103(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.). 
 33 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(5)(a) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4(2) (West, Wes-
tlaw through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(D)(1) (West, 
Westlaw through 2009, file 17 of the 128th Gen. Assem.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-4 
(LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-6 (Westlaw 
through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. Rule 09-09).  South Carolina is unique in that it 
provides for emergency hearings but does not provide for ex parte relief.  S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 20-4-50 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.). 
 34 Maryland’s statute provides for the shortest return period of two days or fewer.  
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-504.1(e)(1)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. 
Sess.).  Nevada’s statute provides for among the longest return periods of forty-five 
days after the date of the application for an extended order.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
33.020(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 74th Reg. Sess. & 25th Special Sess.).  For 
the remaining states, two weeks is the approximate norm.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-
6(a) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Special Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
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mally bears the burden of proving the allegations in the petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
35
  If a final restraining order issues, it 
will normally be limited to a specified period,
36
 but some states allow 
the judge to make the restraining order permanent.
37
  States that do 
put a time limit on these protective orders generally allow extensions 
upon request by the plaintiff and after a hearing.
38
  Final restraining 
orders are normally subject to modification by either party after peti-
tion to the court and a hearing.
39
 
Some features of certain states’ statutes are quite unique, howev-
er.  For example, Arizona’s statute provides that at an ex parte hear-
ing, the court may enter a restraining order against the defendant if 
the court has “reasonable cause to believe . . . [that t]he defendant 
has committed an act of domestic violence”
40
 or even if the court has 
“reasonable cause to believe . . . [that t]he defendant may commit an 
 
6308(5) (LEXIS through 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.050 (West, Westlaw 
through 2009 legislation). 
 35 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-3(c) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/205(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.3 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(1) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of 124th Leg.); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-21-11(1) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 3d Extraordinary 
Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. 
Rule 09-09); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103(b) (LEXIS through 2009–2010 1st Sess. of 
Gen. Assem. & 2009 Special Sess.).       
 36 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(b) (1999) (providing that term may not 
exceed one year); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750(2) (West, Westlaw though 2009 legis-
lation) (stating that term may not exceed three years); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-5 
(Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & Sup. Ct. Rule 09-09) (dictating that term may 
not exceed five years).   
 37 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b)(1) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 
1st Special Sess. of 26th Leg.) (providing no time limit for some provisions of protec-
tive orders); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(6)(c) (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-
204(1) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (stating that the order may be perma-
nent); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on 
restraining orders).   
 38 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(c)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136(F) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West, Westlaw through ch. 19 of 2010 2d Annual Sess.); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).   
 39 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2004 &Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(13) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 173-B:5(VII)(b) (Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 48-27-501(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 4th Extraordinary Sess.).   
 40 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E)(2) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 5th 
Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)).    
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act of domestic violence.”
41
  An ex parte order issued after such a 
hearing is more akin to a final restraining order than a temporary 
one.
42
  If the defendant wants the opportunity to be heard, the de-
fendant must petition the court to obtain a hearing.
43
  Colorado’s sta-
tute similarly inverts the standard procedures.  That statute provides 
that after the court issues an ex parte order, the defendant must “ap-
pear before the court at a specific time and date and . . . show cause, 
if any, why said temporary civil protection order should not be made 
permanent.”
44
  This process of shifting the burden of proof to the de-
fendant is not unique to Colorado; Hawaii similarly requires the de-
fendant to prove his own innocence.
45
 
Other states have interesting features in their statutes as well.  
For example, in Hawaii, a temporary restraining order prevents con-
tact with the plaintiff not only by the defendant but also by the de-
fendant’s attorney.
46
  Hawaii’s statute contains another provision whe-
reby the court, if it finds that the defendant has violated a restraining 
order, may require a global positioning satellite tracking device to be 
affixed to the defendant’s person.
47
  The court may order the defen-
dant to pay for the related costs.
48
  Furthermore, in Colorado, the 
underlying domestic violence that the protection-order statute ad-
 
 41 § 13-3602(E)(1) (emphasis added).   
 42 Compare § 13-3602(G) (listing the relief available to the plaintiff after the ex 
parte hearing), with § 13-3602(L) (stating that the order is effective for one year after 
being served on the defendant), and § 13-3602(I) (stating that the defendant must 
petition the court to obtain a hearing on the matter).   
 43 § 13-3602(I).  For similar provisions in other state statutes, see MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 518B.01(5)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42-925(4) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 101st Leg. 1st Special Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 107.718(11) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.).   
 44 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(5) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 
67th Gen. Assem.).     
 45 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 586-5(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 2d 
Special Sess.) (stating that the court “shall hold a hearing on the application requir-
ing cause to be shown why the order should not continue”). 
 46 See id. § 586-4(c); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009) (limiting 
such communications when a party has counsel but not when she is representing 
herself pro se).  This communication ban would likely hinder any efforts to arrive at 
an amicable property settlement agreement in a situation where the parties are seek-
ing a divorce.   
 47 § 586-4(e) (pertaining to violations of temporary restraining orders); id. § 586-
11(a) (pertaining to violation of final restraining orders).  For similar provisions, see 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2143 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.50.060(1)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).     
 48 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 586-4(e), -11(a) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 2d 
Special Sess.).    
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dresses encompasses not only physical actions and verbal threats but 
also acts of financial, document, and property control.
49
 
States deal with the issue of gun ownership in relation to re-
straining orders in a variety of ways.  Approximately half of the state 
statutes do not specifically address whether the judge may order the 
defendant to relinquish firearms and other weapons when entering 
the restraining order.
50
  Such statutes, however, generally grant the 
judge the authority to order such “other relief” as the judge deems 
necessary for the protection of the victim;
51
 ordering the defendant to 
forfeit his or her weapons is logically within the realm of such “other 
relief.”
52
  Other states explicitly grant the judge the permissive author-
ity to order the defendant to forfeit any weapons.
53
  Many of those 
states permit such an order either if the court makes certain factual 
findings or if the court considers a variety of factors.
54
  Other states 
make forfeiture of firearms mandatory regardless of whether any rea-
son exists to believe that the defendant would violate the restraining 
 
 49 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(b)(I) (LEXIS through Apr. 8, 2010).   
 50 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Special 
Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 
19-13-4 (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.5 (West, Westlaw 
through Jan. 21, 2010 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (Westlaw through 2009 
Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess.); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-5(A) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Sess. of 49th Leg.); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21-105 (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.).    
 51 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(c)(9) (Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess. & 1st Spe-
cial Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legisla-
tion); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-924(1)(g) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 101st Leg. 1st 
Special Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718(1)(h) (West, Westlaw through 2009 
Reg. Sess.).   
 52 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.740(1)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legis-
lation) (authorizing the court to enter “other orders the court believes will be of as-
sistance in eliminating future acts of domestic violence and abuse”), with United 
States v. Calor, 172 F. Supp. 2d 900, 902 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (recounting that the Ken-
tucky state court ordered the defendant to forfeit his firearms under the emergency 
protective order).    
 53 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(8) (1999); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§ 4-506(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
02(4)(g) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.022(b)(6) 
(Vernon, Westlaw through 2009 Reg, Sess. & 1st Called Sess. of 81st Leg.).   
 54 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(6), (7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. 
Sess. & 1st Special Sess. of 26th Leg.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) 
(Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. of 124th Leg.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-
201(2)(f) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(b)(3) 
(West Supp. 2009).     
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order and use the weapon against the plaintiff; one of these states is 
New Jersey.
55
 
As discussed below, federal law moots the distinctions among the 
states as to whether forfeiture of weapons by the restraining order is 
prohibited, permissive, or even mandatory.
56
  Federal law prohibits 
any person who is subject to a state restraining order from possessing 
a firearm regardless of whether the order addresses the matter.
57
  The 
lingering questions are whether such a blanket prohibition is justified 
and, more importantly, whether it is constitutionally permissible. 
C. New Jersey’s Restraining Orders 
This Comment focuses on New Jersey’s domestic-violence statute 
and analyzes it in light of an individual’s right to bear arms as pro-
tected by the Second Amendment.  The law’s mandatory and overly 
broad prohibitions on firearm ownership, in conjunction with the 
laxity of the statute, infringe on defendants’ enumerated rights under 
the Second Amendment.
58
  Revision of the statute is necessary to 
properly balance the constitutional rights of the defendant with the 
interests of the plaintiff. 
1. Status of the Law 
a. General Provisions 
The New Jersey Legislature passed the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act of 1991 to protect adults and emancipated minors from 
domestic violence.
59
  To qualify for protection, a plaintiff must have 
either a household or a dating relationship with the alleged abuser.
60
  
The statute specifies certain prohibited acts that, if committed by the 
 
 55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005).  Such mandatory provisions can be 
found in other states as well.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389(a) (West 2004); W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 48-27-502(b) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through 2009 4th Extraordinary 
Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4m)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Act 99).     
 56 See infra Part II.C.2.b.   
 57 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).   
 58 See infra Part III.B.   
 59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17, -18 (West 2005).  For a discussion of various policy 
issues surrounding this and other related statutes, see generally Melanie L. Mecka, 
Note, Seizing the Ammunition from Domestic Violence: Prohibiting the Owning of Firearms by 
Abusers, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 607 (1998).   
 60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2005).  An “emancipated minor” is some-
one under the age of eighteen who is either pregnant or has a child, is married, has 
entered military service, or has been previously declared by a court or administrative 
agency to be emancipated.  § 2C:25-19(e).   
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defendant, would warrant the protection of the courts.
61
  The statute 
names fourteen predicate acts (all of which are codified as substan-
tive crimes in New Jersey) that range from the more severe crimes of 
homicide and sexual assault to the lesser crimes of terroristic threats, 
lewdness, and harassment.
62
  These predicate offenses are intended to 
aid the court in deciding whether the plaintiff was subject to “poten-
tial abusive and controlling behavior.”
63
 
Plaintiffs are entitled to seek ex parte relief from the courts in 
the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
64
  Generally speak-
ing, a court may enter such ex parte relief “when necessary to protect 
the life, health or well-being of a victim.”
65
  If it “appears that the 
plaintiff is in danger of domestic violence” and “good cause [is] 
shown,” the court may issue a TRO that will remain in effect until the 
court holds a further hearing.
66
  The TRO may prevent the defendant 
from returning to the scene of the domestic violence (which often 
means evicting the defendant from his home) and “may include . . . 
forbidding the defendant from possessing any firearm or other wea-
pon.”
67
  The definition of “other weapon” is quite broad in New Jersey 
law and thus allows the judge to prohibit the defendant from possess-
ing antique daggers, swords, or even household kitchen knives.
68
  The 
issuance of a TRO is “immediately appealable” by the defendant for 
de novo review,
69
 but because the standard is so low (i.e., whether it 
“appears that the plaintiff is in danger of domestic violence”) 
70
 such 
an appeal is arguably of little practical value. 
Within ten days of the issuance of the TRO, the court holds a 
hearing to determine whether to extend the ex parte relief granted 
by issuing a final restraining order (FRO).
71
  To grant an FRO, the 
court must make a finding that the defendant has committed an act 
of domestic violence—which would itself be a criminal act punishable 
 
 61 § 2C:25-19(a). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Tribuzio v. Roder, 813 A.2d 1210, 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).   
 64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(f) (West 2005).   
 65 Id.   
 66 § 2C:25-28(g), (i).   
 67 § 2C:25-28(j). 
 68 Compare id. (defining “other weapon[s]” that the court may seize as those de-
tailed in section 2C:39-1), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (liberally defining “weapon”).   
 69 § 2C:25-28(i).   
 70 § 2C:25-28(g) (emphasis added).   
 71 Id. § 2C:25-29(a).   
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by law
72
—or the defendant must admit committing such an act.
73
  Un-
like criminal proceedings, where the state must prove the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiff in the FRO hearing on-
ly need prove the allegations by the lesser standard of a “preponder-
ance of the evidence,”
74
 the lowest standard that the law provides.
75
  
Thus the court may find the defendant to have committed a criminal 
act (which under this statute includes even murder) by the lower, civ-
il standard of proof.
76
  Interestingly, though, such a judicial finding of 
the commission of a predicate crime is divorced from criminal pro-
ceedings, and the abuser is not subject to penal sanctions unless the 
state files a separate indictment.
77
 
While the judge may remove the defendant’s weapons upon is-
suance of the TRO,
78
 the statute mandates that, upon the issuance of 
an FRO, the judge order the defendant to forfeit all weapons as well 
as any firearms-purchaser identification card.
79
  An exception exists 
whereby law-enforcement officers and military personnel may be 
permitted to carry weapons while on duty,
80
 but such exceptions are 
greatly curtailed by a federal law that prohibits people subject to re-
straining orders from possessing weapons, as the federal law does not 
provide these exceptions.
81
  In addition to the mandatory forfeiture of 
firearms, the judge may also order the defendant to surrender all 
knives, daggers, swords, bludgeons, slingshots, and even pepper spray 
 
 72 Id. § 2C:25-19(a). 
 73 § 2C:25-29(a).   
 74 Id.   
 75 12 SUSAN REACH WINTERS & THOMAS D. BALDWIN, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE: FAMILY 
LAW AND PRACTICE WITH FORMS § 47.13 (1999) (stating that “preponderance of the 
evidence” is the lowest evidential standard and thus below both “clear and convinc-
ing evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt”).   
 76 Compare § 2C:25-19(a), with § 2C:25-29(a).   
 77 Cf. id. § 2C:25-28(a) (stating that the filing of a civil complaint for domestic 
violence does not prevent the separate filing of a criminal complaint for the same 
acts). 
 78 § 2C:25-28(j). 
 79 Id. § 2C:25-29(b).   
 80 Id.   
 81 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).  In essence, then, a New Jersey restraining 
order results in a mandatory change of duties (or possibly dismissal) of active service 
personnel.  Federal law does, however, permit the defendant to petition the Attorney 
General for an exemption when the restrained person’s possession of a firearm 
would not be contrary to public interest.  Id. § 925(c).   
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that the defendant may own.
82
  The FRO must withdraw the defen-
dant’s gun rights (plus any other weapon rights that the judge choos-
es to curtail) for the greater of either two years or the duration of the 
FRO;
83
 New Jersey restraining orders are presumptively unlimited in 
duration.
84
 
In addition to the mandatory and permissive restrictions on a 
defendant’s possession of weapons, a great many other remedies are 
available to the plaintiff who prevails in the action.
85
  Not only will the 
FRO prohibit defendant from committing acts of domestic violence 
or otherwise contacting the plaintiff,
86
 but the plaintiff may also re-
ceive exclusive possession of the residence or household, and the 
court may require the defendant to pay the rent or mortgage.
87
  The 
court may limit the parenting time that the defendant may have with 
the parties’ children.
88
  The judge may order the defendant to reim-
burse the plaintiff for monetary losses suffered as a result of the do-
mestic violence.
89
  Furthermore, the court may require the defendant 
to attend domestic-violence counseling and to pay personally for such 
expenses.
90
  The court may even order the defendant to undergo psy-
chiatric evaluation.
91
  The list of remedies is expansive and tempting, 
especially when considering that the plaintiff has the power to make a 
soon-to-be “ex” miserable.
92
 
Once issued, an FRO is presumptively valid for the remainder of 
the parties’ lives unless the judge placed an expiration date on the 
order at the time of issuance.
93
  Either party may move to modify or 
dissolve the FRO at any time,
94
 but the moving party must overcome a 
 
 82 Compare § 2C:25-29(b)(16) (defining “other weapon[s]” that may be seized as 
those detailed in section 2C:39-1), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (defining “weapon” liberally).   
 83 § 2C:25-29(b).   
 84 See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 85 See § 2C:25-29(b).   
 86 § 2C:25-29(b)(1), (7).   
 87 § 2C:25-29(b)(2), (8). 
 88 § 2C:25-29(b)(3), (11).   
 89 § 2C:25-29(b)(4).   
 90 § 2C:25-29(b)(5).   
 91 § 2C:25-29(b)(18).   
 92 See Cathy Young, Hitting Below the Belt, SALON.COM, Oct. 25, 1999, 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/1999/10/25/restraining_orders/index.html.  
Notably, New Jersey statute imposes mandatory fines on those against whom final re-
straining orders are issued.  N.J STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29.1 (West 2005).       
 93 See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 94 § 2C:25-29(d).   
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fairly substantial burden to succeed on such a motion.  The motion 
may only be heard by either (1) the same judge who originally issued 
the FRO or (2) a judge who has a complete record of the hearing 
upon which the order was based.
95
  Before the court even considers 
having the order dissolved, the moving party bears the burden of 
making a prima facie showing of good cause that the order should be 
dissolved
96
 and must demonstrate “substantial changes in the circums-
tances” since the time of the issuance of the FRO.
97
  The court must 
then “carefully scrutinize the record and carefully consider the totali-
ty of the circumstances”
98
 by weighing a series of factors to aid it in its 
determination.
99
  Even when the plaintiff is the party requesting the 
dissolution of the FRO, the court is not required to grant the mo-
tion.
100
  The court’s responsibility is “to protect victims,” and the court 
will make its decision based on whether it feels that the victim re-
mains at risk of domestic violence.
101
  This standard for dissolving an 
FRO is debatably more demanding than the standard by which such 
an order is granted in the first instance, especially when other factors 
are considered.
102
 
New Jersey’s statute additionally imposes certain record-keeping 
requirements on the courts for all domestic-violence complaints, re-
gardless of whether an FRO issues.
103
  The Administrative Office of 
the Courts is required to maintain a uniform record of all domestic-
violence complaints and TRO filings to generate periodic reports and 
statistical data.
104
  Additionally, this office must keep a central registry 
of all people with restraining orders filed against them.
105
  While the 
information is confidential,
106
 the records cannot be expunged even if 
the plaintiff drops the complaint and no criminal proceedings are 
 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Kanaszka v. Kunen, 713 A.2d 565, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).   
 98 Id. at 567.   
 99 Carfagno v. Carfagno, 672 A.2d 751, 756–57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) 
(listing the eleven factors that the court should consider on a motion to dissolve a 
restraining order).   
 100 Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998). 
 101 Id.   
 102 See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the other factors that militate toward the grant-
ing of a restraining order).   
 103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-33(a) (West 2005).   
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. § 2C:25-34. 
 106 §§ 2C:25-33, -34.   
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filed.
107
  In essence, the once-alleged abuser (now exonerated) is for-
ever on a list of domestic abusers.  This branding is not limited to the 
confines of New Jersey, however, as the federal government keeps its 
own databases to identify those labeled as “abusers” anywhere in the 
country.
108
 
b. Specific Precedent 
It is generally not difficult to obtain a restraining order against 
one’s domestic partner in an abusive relationship.  When a defendant 
actually strikes or otherwise physically abuses the plaintiff, such acts 
(sufficient for a conviction for assault)
109
 would certainly justify the 
imposition of a restraining order.
110
  Few would seriously argue that 
restraining orders are anything less than clearly appropriate in cases 
of physical violence.  Whether to issue an FRO becomes less obvious, 
however, where the defendant has not physically abused the plaintiff 
but rather only used heated words or engaged in other nonviolent 
acts: the law permits the issuance of an FRO on allegations of lewd-
ness, terroristic threats, and harassment.
111
 
Courts have properly issued FROs on a theory of harassment 
against individuals who made phone calls with offensively coarse lan-
guage at inconvenient hours
112
 and mailed pornographic pictures of 
the victim to a third party, implying that the pictures might be mailed 
to the plaintiff’s workplace and son.
113
  Situations like these represent 
cases where the defendant clearly sought to harass the plaintiff so as 
to cause emotional harm.  Thus the courts unsurprisingly issued 
FROs based on these facts. 
What is perhaps more revealing of the arguable ease with which 
a plaintiff may receive a restraining order are cases where the trial 
court issued an FRO that was later overturned by the appellate court.  
In one such case, the defendant told his wife that he no longer loved 
or desired her, and the judge issued an FRO on a theory of harass-
 
 107 In re Expungement of the Criminal Record of M.D.Z., 668 A.2d 423, 425 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).   
 108 See supra note 3.   
 109 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1 (West 2005) (criminalizing assault).  
 110 Id. § 2C:25-19(a) (including assault among the predicate crimes for a finding 
of domestic violence).   
 111 Id.   
 112 D.V. v. A.H., 926 A.2d 887, 888 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2007).   
 113 McGowan v. O’Rourke, 918 A.2d 716, 717 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).   
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ment.
114
  In another situation, the defendant and the plaintiff were 
having a heated argument, and the defendant slammed the door.
115
  
The defendant later moved all of the plaintiff’s personal possessions 
out of the apartment into a storage locker in the plaintiff’s name, and 
the trial judge deemed these acts sufficient for an FRO.
116
  Another 
judge issued a restraining order on a claim that the defendant’s me-
thod of disciplining the children differed from the plaintiff’s and 
thereby caused the plaintiff injury.
117
  Similarly, an FRO issued after 
the defendant moved his wife’s desk out of the common office and 
took the parties’ children to counseling instead of choir practice.
118
  
Yet another example is where the judge issued an FRO against the 
defendant for harassment because he left a seemingly innocuous 
note on his girlfriend’s car that asked her to “[p]lease page [him].”
119
 
In each of these cases, the trial judge issued an FRO that the ap-
pellate court later overturned.
120
  If, however, the defendants in these 
cases lacked the time, the motivation, or the financial wherewithal to 
appeal the determination, the restraining orders would have poten-
tially remained in effect for the rest of the parties’ joint lives
121
 and 
thus permanently deprived the defendants of their constitutional 
right to own weapons.  An unadvisedly issued restraining order from 
a lower court has far-reaching effects on the defendant’s liberties. 
c. Nonjudicial Proceedings 
The issuance of restraining orders in judicial proceedings is not 
the only way in which defendants may lose their firearm rights in New 
Jersey.  The statute itself permits police to seize weapons even without 
a court order.
122
 
New Jersey’s statute states that upon responding to a scene of 
domestic violence, law-enforcement officers are required to seize any 
weapon that they believe would expose the victim to a risk of serious 
 
 114 Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).   
 115 Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
 116 Id.   
 117 E.K. v. G.K., 575 A.2d 883, 884 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).   
 118 L.D. v. W.D., 742 A.2d 588, 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).   
 119 J.F. v. B.K., 706 A.2d 203, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (The note 
stated, “Please page me 290-6512.  I would like to talk to you.  It’s a must.  Thanks.”).  
 120 See sources cited supra notes 114–19.  
 121 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on re-
straining orders).    
 122 Id. § 2C:25-21(d)(1)(b).   
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bodily injury.
123
  The police may seize the alleged abuser’s weapons at 
the request of the alleged victim even if the weapon was in no way re-
lated to the domestic-violence incident.
124
  In fact, county prosecutor 
offices have been known to issue policy directives under which law-
enforcement officers are instructed to inquire of the victim whether 
the accused possesses any weapons; “[i]f so, the firearms should be 
kept for safe keeping.”
125
  Upon petition by the county prosecutor to 
prevent the return of weapons to the accused, the court must hold a 
“summary” hearing
126
 to determine whether the weapons should be 
retained pursuant to section 2C:58-3, which permits the court to deny 
the return of seized weapons if it would not be in the interest of “pub-
lic health, safety or welfare.”
127
 
Courts are very unlikely to take seriously any argument claiming 
that the protections of the Second Amendment are absolute.  Even 
the Supreme Court mentioned in the Heller decision (albeit in dicta) 
that “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensi-
tive places . . . , or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”
128
  But is New Jersey’s law, with its sweeping 
and often mandatory restrictions on gun ownership, sufficiently 
crafted to avoid infringing upon defendants’ Second Amendment 
rights?  The strict standards, when considered in conjunction with 
the law in practice and the arguably widespread abuse in the system, 
are overbroad and thereby infringe upon defendants’ Second 
Amendment rights.
129
 
2. Interaction with Other Laws 
No law exists in a vacuum.  To properly understand and then 
correctly analyze the Second Amendment implications of New Jer-
sey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, seeing how other laws in-
teract with that statute at both the state and the federal levels is ne-
 
 123 Id.   
 124 Hoffman v. Union County Prosecutor, 572 A.2d 1200, 1202 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1990).   
 125 Id. at 1200.   
 126 § 2C:25-21(d)(3).   
 127 Id. § 2C:58-3(c)(5).    
 128 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).   
 129 See infra Part III.B.  
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cessary.  Severe and oftentimes irrevocable collateral consequences 
occur for those who have restraining orders filed against them.
130
 
a. Additional New Jersey Statutes 
Section 2C:58-3 of New Jersey’s statutes generally describes who 
may purchase a firearm in the state, what sorts of identification one 
must have, and what other procedures one must follow before obtain-
ing a firearm.
131
  No person who has been criminally convicted of an 
act of domestic violence may receive a permit to purchase a wea-
pon.
132
  Similarly, no person who is subject to a restraining order may 
obtain such a permit so long as the restraining order limits firearm 
rights,
133
 and FROs are required to prohibit firearm ownership.
134
  
Even when the plaintiff drops a domestic-violence action, the court 
still has the discretion to deny the return of the weapons to the de-
fendant on the theory that the defendant’s possession of weapons 
“would not be in the interest of the public health, safety or welfare.”
135
  
Some commentators have argued that this roundabout provision has 
the potential for abuse because a person initially accused in a possibly 
frivolous action will be subject to a second judicial proceeding and 
may consequently lose gun rights after having done nothing wrong in 
the first instance.
136
 
A subprovision in this firearm statute is subsection 2C:58-
3(c)(8), which states that a firearm-purchaser identification card shall 
not be issued to “any person whose firearm is seized pursuant to the 
‘Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991’ and whose firearm has 
not been returned.”
137
  The New Jersey Supreme Court recently in-
terpreted this language to mean that satisfaction of any of the condi-
tions annunciated in section 2C:25-21(d)(3) bars the court from re-
turning a gun permit to the defendant.
138
  Those conditions include a 
 
 130 See infra Part II.C.2.a–b. 
 131 § 2C:58-3. 
 132 § 2C:58-3(c)(1).   
 133 § 2C:58-3(c)(6).   
 134 Id. § 2C:25-29(b).   
 135 § 2C:58-3(c)(5); see In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 693 A.2d 92 (N.J. 1997).   
 136 Stacey Eisenberg, Recent Development, Criminal Law—Prevention of Domestic 
Violence Act—Defendant Who Poses Threat to Public Health, Safety, or Welfare Is Not Entitled 
to a Return of Firearms Even if Domestic Violence Complaint Against That Defendant Has 
Been Dismissed: In the Matter of Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 693 A.2d 
92 (1997), 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1710, 1715–16 (1997).   
 137 § 2C:58-3(c)(8) (citations omitted).   
 138 M.S. v. Millburn Police Dep’t, 962 A.2d 515, 524 (N.J. 2008).   
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showing by the prosecutor that the “owner is unfit or that the owner 
poses a threat to the public in general or a person or persons in par-
ticular.”
139
  Because restraining orders require the defendant to sur-
render any firearms, this particular provision generally applies only in 
situations where the police seize the defendant’s guns upon respond-
ing to a domestic-violence complaint, where the plaintiff does not 
seek a restraining order, and where the prosecutor later makes a mo-
tion to prevent the weapons from being returned to the defendant.
140
 
b. Federal Statutes on Domestic Violence 
The list of laws that interact with New Jersey’s domestic-violence 
statute is not limited to state legislation.
141
  The federal government, 
in another all too common extension of its power through the Com-
merce Clause, has also passed a series of statutes relating to domestic-
violence restraining orders.
142
  One such statute is 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261–
2266, which makes it a crime punishable in federal court to travel in 
interstate commerce with the intent to commit an act of violence or 
harassment in contravention of a state restraining order if the defen-
dant actually engages in the prohibited conduct (i.e., assaults or ha-
rasses the protected person).
143
  Because this particular provision is 
conditioned not only on the existence of a valid restraining order but 
also on the physical violation of the terms of the order by the com-
mission of a substantive crime,
144
 this law is vulnerable to comparative-
ly less criticism.  Other provisions, however, are perhaps not so unas-
sailable. 
A subsection of this particular statute requires that all states give 
“full faith and credit” to every portion of a restraining order issued by 
any state provided that certain minimum due process requirements 
are met.
145
  Thus a state with very lax standards for issuing a restrain-
ing order
146
 may enter such a protective order, and every state and 
 
 139 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(d)(3) (West 2005).    
 140 Compare id. § 2C:25-29(b) (requiring the FRO to remove the defendant’s gun 
rights), with id. § 2C:25-21(d)(3) (stating that weapons seized in accordance with the 
Act “shall be returned to the owner except upon order of the Superior Court” and 
granting the prosecutor the right to petition the court to obtain title to the firearms).    
 141 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 2261–2266 (2006).   
 142 See, e.g., id. 
 143 § 2262(a)(1).   
 144 Id.   
 145 § 2265(a).   
 146 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 
5th Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)) (permitting a restraining order on a find-
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federal territory would be required to adhere to every provision, in-
cluding any limitations on gun ownership. 
The federal statute that generally restricts and defines firearm 
ownership also addresses domestic-violence actions in a variety of 
ways.
147
  That law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), makes it illegal for any person 
to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to a person 
who either has been convicted of an act of domestic violence or is 
subject to a restraining order.
148
  Similarly, § 922(g)(9) prohibits any-
one from possessing a firearm following conviction for a crime of 
domestic violence.
149
  Because this latter section is a prohibition con-
ditioned on an actual criminal conviction,
150
 it is less vulnerable to at-
tack because it reasonably relates to the general policy of keeping 
firearms out of the hands of those who present a credible threat to 
the safety of others.
151
  For that reason, courts that have examined the 
constitutionality of this provision have found it to be valid.
152
 
Yet another federal prohibition relates to the employment of the 
defendant.  Under § 922(h), a person either subject to a restraining 
order or convicted of a crime of domestic violence may not “receive, 
possess, or transport any firearm or ammunition” through the course 
of employment.
153
  This provision would clearly prohibit such an indi-
vidual from working at a firearm retail store, a weapons manufactur-
ing facility, or a shooting range.
154
  Such prohibitions would seem rea-
sonable enough in that those employment contexts are directly 
 
ing that the defendant may commit an act of domestic violence).  For a more de-
tailed discussion of this particular statute, see supra Part II.B. 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g), (h).   
 148 § 922(d)(8), (9).   
 149 § 922(g)(9).   
 150 Id.   
 151 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 14 (1993) (“[I]ndividuals with a history of 
domestic violence should not have easy access to firearms.”).   
 152 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 236 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
the statute does not violate the Second Amendment); Gillespie v. City of Indianapo-
lis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that such proscription does not violate 
the Second Amendment but focusing on a militia right theory).  For similar hold-
ings, see also United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on a 
militia-right theory); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 624 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(same); Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 173 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C. 
1999) (same).  For post-Heller decisions upholding the constitutionality of this sta-
tute, see United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Me. 2008); United States v. 
White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala., Aug. 6, 2008).   
 153 18 U.S.C. § 922(h)(1) (2006). 
 154 See id.   
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related to the use of firearms.  But what about a professional truck 
driver whose employer needs sealed crates of weapons delivered to a 
customer?  What about an employee of a large retail store (such as K-
Mart or Walmart) that happens to have a sporting section that sells 
hunting equipment—albeit in a section of the store where the em-
ployee is not assigned?  And what about a server at an establishment 
that keeps a firearm behind the bar?  The employment implications 
are potentially far-reaching and could easily be extended to any con-
text where a firearm or ammunition may be either necessary or colla-
terally related.  Arguably, denying people these sorts of job opportun-
ities merely because they are subject to restraining orders that may 
not even find that they pose a threat to the physical safety of the 
plaintiff would be unreasonable.  This particular provision casts the 
net far wider than is reasonably necessary. 
The last, and perhaps most troubling, federal law in this area is § 
922(g)(8).  This law prohibits anyone from possessing a firearm if 
that person is subject to a state restraining order.
155
  In theory, this 
provision seems reasonable in that it prevents those who might 
present a colorable threat to the safety of others from possessing a 
dangerous weapon.
156
  It is dependent, however, on the existence of 
valid restraining orders issued by the states
157
 because no federal law 
(except for the District of Columbia)
158
 authorizes the issuance of a 
domestic-violence restraining order by a federal court.  If a state 
should issue an outrageous restraining order against a defendant, 
then the federal law would operate where it may not have been in-
tended to do so.
159
 
With this in mind, Congress included a restriction whereby pro-
tective orders will be recognized for the purpose of this statute only if 
(1) a hearing was held on the matter, (2) the defendant received no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard, and (3) the order restrains the 
defendant from engaging in conduct that would place a reasonable 
person in fear of bodily injury.
160
  Additionally, the state protective 
 
 155 § 922(g)(8).   
 156 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 14 (1993).   
 157 § 922(g)(8).   
 158 D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (Westlaw through Jan. 3, 2010) (authorizing the is-
suance of domestic-violence restraining orders in the District of Columbia).   
 159 See, e.g., Hession, supra note 1, at 12–13 (describing a restraining order issued 
against David Letterman for the protection of a woman whom he had never met on a 
theory that his presence on television harassed her).   
 160 § 922(g)(8).   
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order must either include a finding that the defendant “represents a 
credible threat to the physical safety” of the plaintiff
161
 or explicitly 
prohibit the use or threat of physical force against the plaintiff.
162
  
Provided that a state meets these minimal burdens, the federal gov-
ernment will prevent the defendant from possessing a firearm even 
where the state court did not find such a prohibition to be necessary 
or otherwise justified.
163
  Whether these procedural safeguards are 
sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of defendants has led 
courts to yield conflicted results.
164
 
Many of the federal courts that have upheld this particular pro-
vision under a Second Amendment analysis did so under the now 
outdated “militia right” theory.
165
  One court stated in dicta that even 
if an individual right to bear arms existed and strict scrutiny were to 
apply, the statute would be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.
166
  That particular court, however, was dealing 
with a restraining order of limited duration, unlike New Jersey’s or-
ders, which have no such expiration dates.
167
  Some post-Heller cases 
have also upheld the constitutionality of this federal statute, but they 
often relied on restraining-order limitations that do not exist in New 
Jersey’s FROs.
168
 
 
 161 § 922(g)(8)(C)(i).   
 162 § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii).   
 163 See § 922(g)(8).   
 164 See infra notes 167–75 and accompanying text. 
 165 See, e.g., United States v. Bayles, 310 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2000).   
 166 United States v. Lippman, 369 F.3d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 2004).  For a similar 
result, see United States v. Miles, 238 F. Supp. 2d 297, 301, 303 (D. Me. 2002), which 
held that even if the Second Amendment protected a fundamental, individual right, 
the statute would be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest because 
it requires a finding that someone poses a threat of violence.  In Miles, however, the 
district court relied in part on a factual finding made by the state court that the de-
fendant posed a threat of committing acts of violence.  Id. at 302–03.  This ruling is 
thus limited because the federal statute requires either that (1) the person pose a 
threat of violence or (2) the state restraining order prohibit the defendant from 
committing an act of violence.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).  Thus the federal 
government possibly would deny someone the right to possess weapons based on a 
restraining order that does not find that he poses a threat of violence.  Rather, he 
could simply be subject to a restraining order that prohibits him from committing 
acts of violence.   
 167 Lippman, 369 F.3d at 1044; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (impos-
ing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 168 See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S, 2009 WL 667229, at *3–4 
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009) (stating that no post-Heller decisions have found the statute 
to be unconstitutional but focusing mainly on the fact that the indictment met the 
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A district court in the Fifth Circuit analyzing this law reached a 
different conclusion.  The court in United States v. Emerson (a case 
preceding Heller) first found that an individual right to bear arms ex-
isted.
169
  The court then found that because the federal law “allows a 
state court divorce proceeding, without particularized findings of the 
threat of future violence, to automatically deprive a citizen of his 
Second Amendment rights,” this statute violated the defendant’s con-
stitutional rights.
170
  “That such a routine civil order has such exten-
sive consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes 
the statute unconstitutional.”
171
 
Examining the case on appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
finding of an individual right to bear arms in the Second Amend-
ment
172
 but reversed the determination that the federal statute vi-
olated that right.
173
  The court noted that, even without specific find-
ings, the state restraining order was constitutional because the 
defendant received notice and a hearing.
174
  The court then found a 
sufficient nexus between firearm possession by the defendant and the 
threat of lawless violence to make constitutional such restrictions on 
his Second Amendment rights.
175
  But the mere presence of notice 
and a hearing is arguably too low of a standard by which to deprive 
the defendant of specifically enumerated rights.  In some jurisdic-
tions the hearing may be more akin to an administrative step in 
which the defendant is presumed guilty.
176
 
 
requirements of the statute rather than discussing the unconstitutionality argument 
raised by the defendant); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021–23 
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding the statute constitutional but relying in part on the limited 
duration of the state restraining order); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556, 
2008 WL 4534058, at *2–3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding the statute “narrowly 
crafted” to a “compelling governmental interest” but relying on the fact that the limi-
tation is a “temporary prohibition”); United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 
226–27 (D. Me. 2008) (finding that the statute was narrowly tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest although the case actually involved the making of false state-
ments on an application to purchase firearms). 
 169 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 610 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).   
 170 Id.   
 171 Id. at 611.  
 172 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 229 (5th Cir. 2001).   
 173 Id. at 265.  
 174 Id. at 262.   
 175 Id. at 264.   
 176 See infra Part II.C.3 for a discussion of this issue as it relates to New Jersey.  See 
also supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing states where the defendant 
bears the burden of proving innocence).     
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When New Jersey defendants have restraining orders filed 
against them, the collateral consequences extend far beyond the spe-
cifics of those restrictions listed on the face of the orders.  The de-
fendants will lose their right to own any weapons and must turn over 
any firearms that they may have owned in the past.
177
  If they are em-
ployed in any business where firearms or ammunition relate even 
remotely to the operation of the business, they may either have to re-
sign or transfer
178
 lest they be subject to criminal prosecution.
179
  The 
government places their names in a national database of domestic 
abusers,
180
 and they are permanently stigmatized as “wife beaters.”
181
  
With all of these severe and oftentimes permanent collateral conse-
quences, ensuring that every restraining order issued is justified and 
not (as discussed in the next section) the product of an overzealous 
court or an unscrupulous plaintiff abusing the system is all the more 
important.
182
 
3. Restraining Orders in Practice 
“A litmus test of how vulnerable TROs are to abuse is how easy 
they are to obtain.”
183
  In perhaps no other area of the law is the 
temptation for abuse quite as great as it is in domestic-violence ac-
tions.
184
  A plaintiff willing to exaggerate past incidents or even com-
 
 177 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005).   
 178 See § 922(h).  
 179 See id. § 924(a) (setting forth applicable criminal penalties).   
 180 See supra note 3.   
 181 In re Expungement of the Criminal Record of M.D.Z., 668 A.2d 423, 425 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (stating that the defendant’s name need not be removed 
from New Jersey’s register of domestic abusers even if no charges are filed and the 
restraining order is later vacated).   
 182 See infra Part II.C.3.   
 183 Wendy McElroy, Abuse of Temporary Restraining Orders Endangers Real Victims, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,179842,00.html.  
 184 See David N. Heleniak, The New Star Chamber: The New Jersey Family Court and the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1009, 1014 (2005) (characteriz-
ing the potential for abuse as “tremendous”).  See generally Scott A. Lerner, Combating 
Orders-of-Protection Abuse in Divorce, 95 ILL. B.J. 590 (2007) (describing the temptation 
for abuse by plaintiffs of the domestic-violence statutes of Illinois, which provide 
much of the same relief as the divorce statutes but at a fraction of the time and with 
lower burdens of proof); Charles E. Corry, Abuse of Protection Orders, 
http://www.dvmen.org/dv-16.htm#restraint (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (stating that 
“the law encourages the [plaintiff] to lie” and that “the temptation [for abuse] may 
well be irresistible”).  
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mit perjury can have access to a responsive support group, a sympa-
thetic court, and a litany of immediate relief.
185
 
The current situation of New Jersey restraining orders is perhaps 
best understood by means of a hypothetical example.  A New Jersey 
couple has been married for a number of years, but their relationship 
has taken a turn for the worse.  The husband and wife have gradually 
grown to dislike one another and frequently argue.  One of the 
spouses decides that they should divorce.  After one final argument, 
the husband leaves the house for a few hours.  The wife wants him 
out of her life immediately and thus goes to court and files a domes-
tic-violence complaint.  The theory could be one of harassment, and 
she could simply embellish their last argument, or she could claim 
that he threatened to hit her.  The wife fills out a few forms, stands in 
front of a judge very shortly afterwards, and obtains an ex parte re-
straining order against her husband that very same day.
186
 
The court has just evicted the husband from his home and de-
clared that he will only be permitted to return to pick up a few per-
sonal belongings if a law-enforcement officer accompanies him.
187
  
Maybe the husband has the money to move into a motel for a few 
days, or maybe he does not.  The order says that within ten days a 
hearing on the matter will be held before a judge to determine 
whether to make the restraining order permanent.
188
  Perhaps he 
does not think to hire a lawyer, or perhaps he simply does not have 
the money to pay for one.  The police search his home and confiscate 
his hunting rifles and his antique saber from the Civil War that had 
been passed down in his family for generations.
189
 
In about a week, he shows up to court after living in a motel for 
the past ten days (if he is lucky), and his wife formally accuses him of 
being a domestic abuser.
190
  She claims that he threatened to hit her; 
he denies the allegation.  Because the standard of proof is very low
191
 
 
 185 See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014; Young, supra note 92.   
 186 For a discussion of the exact procedure, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 
2005).   
 187 See § 2C:25-28(j), (k).   
 188 Continuances are sometimes allowed in the interest of “fundamental fairness.”  
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405, 413 (N.J. 2003).  Many husbands are no doubt unaware 
of this option as not all men hire attorneys.  See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014–15.   
 189 See § 2C:25-28(j) (authorizing the removal of other weapons in addition to 
firearms).   
 190 See id. § 2C:25-29(a).   
 191 Id. (setting the standard as by a “preponderance of the evidence”).   
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and because the judge is very cautious about denying the request for 
fear that the plaintiff could be telling the truth,
192
 the judge issues a 
final restraining order.  The terms of the restraining order grant the 
wife exclusive possession of the home
193
 and require the husband to 
keep paying the mortgage.
194
  He is told that he can only see his child-
ren at designated times when a court-ordered supervisor is present.
195
  
The wife is permitted to have sole possession of the family car and 
other personal property that she had petitioned from the court, in-
cluding the checkbook.
196
  He is denied the return of his hunting 
rifles and antique saber, and he is told that he might never be permit-
ted to purchase any other weapons for the rest of his life.
197
  And as a 
final blow, the husband is told that he needs to undergo psychiatric 
evaluation
198
 and attend domestic-violence counseling;
199
 the court 
orders him to pay the counselor personally.
200
 
Advocate groups and commentators have been arguing for years 
about the potential for abuse inherent within the domestic-violence 
system.
201
  If a spouse is willing to fill out an inaccurate affidavit and 
exaggerate past facts that, like an allegation of a verbal threat, may be 
impossible to disprove, the spouse can gain the upper hand in a di-
 
 192 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see infra notes 213–27 and accom-
panying text. 
 193 See § 2C:25-29(b)(2).   
 194 See § 2C:25-29(b)(8).   
 195 See § 2C:25-29(b)(3).   
 196 See § 2C:25-29(b)(9).   
 197 See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 198 See § 2C:25-29(b)(16).   
 199 See § 2C:25-29(b)(5).   
 200 See id.   
 201 See, e.g., RADAR SERVS., INC., WITHOUT RESTRAINT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
DOMESTIC RESTRAINING ORDERS 6, http://www.radarsvcs.org/docs/RADARreport-
VAWA-Restraining-Orders.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (stating that restraining or-
ders are used as bargaining chips in divorce proceedings); Heleniak, supra note 184, 
at 1014; Thomas J. Kasper, Obtaining and Defending Against an Order of Protection, 93 
ILL. B.J. 290, 290 (2005), available at http://www.fathersunite.org/ 
Restraining%20Orders%20and%20Domestic%20Violence/RestrainingOrderIL.html 
(stating that protection orders “can also become part of the gamesmanship of di-
vorce”); Cathy Young, The Abuse of Restraining Orders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1999, 
at A19 (stating that FROs are abused as a tactical advantage); Young, supra note 92; 
Corry, supra note 184 (stating that FROs “have also been abused in divorces to keep 
assets” and quoting the California bar as having expressed concern that “protective 
orders are increasingly being used in family law cases to help one side jockey for an 
advantage in child custody”).  See generally Lerner, supra note 184 (describing cases of 
abuse discussed by the Illinois appellate courts). 
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vorce proceeding after years of planning while the other spouse will 
have fewer than ten days to prepare for the hearing.
202
  Many practi-
tioners in this field and defendants’ rights groups vehemently argue 
that the law is abused,
203
 and some posit that restraining orders are 
commonly used as leverage tools by pseudo-victims to seek financial 
concessions in return for dropping the FRO.
204
 
Naturally, other scholars and advocate groups argue that allega-
tions of abuse of the system by plaintiffs are unfounded.
205
  Reliable 
data on the rate of actual abuse by plaintiffs is difficult to obtain,
206
 
and personal opinions by practitioners are subject to being tainted by 
the individual’s predispositions.  But while actual abuse is difficult to 
 
 202 See Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1014.   
 203 See, e.g., RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 9 (quoting Dorothy Wright, a 
New Jersey attorney and former board member of a women’s shelter, as estimating 
that forty to fifty percent of all restraining orders are requested “purely as a legal 
maneuver”); Jeffrey M. Leving & Glenn Sacks, Electronic Tagging Device Bill Will Harm 
Innocent Men, BUFFALO NEWS, May 30, 2007, at A6 (discussing the abuse of restraining 
orders from the perspective of a family-law attorney); Mike McCormick & Glenn 
Sacks, Restraining Orders Can Be Straitjackets on Justice, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.), July 28, 
2008, at 15 (“Anybody who practices family law sees people who abuse the restraining 
order process.  Some create false allegations or take minor insignificant acts and use 
them to remove their spouse or partner from the home for advantage in litigation.  
Such abuses undermine victims of real abuse and violence who seek protection.”); see 
also Young, supra note 92.   
 204 See RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 6, 8 (stating that many restraining 
orders are used for tactical advantages in litigation); Heleniak, supra note 184, at 
1014; Kasper, supra note 201, at 290 (arguing that FROs have become “part of the 
gamesmanship of divorce”); Young, supra note 92.   
 205 See McElroy, supra note 183 (stating that women’s groups maintain that the 
abuse of TROs is rare); Paul Moreno, Groups Fight to End Abuse of Restraining Orders, 
Most Mass. Media Ignore the Story: Cellucci and Feminists Want to Add to Existing Laws, 
MASS. NEWS, June 23, 2000, http://www.massnews.com/past_issues/2000/10_Oct/ 
1009aw.htm (quoting an attorney from the Battered Women’s Legal Assistance 
Project as having stated that “there is no evidence that restraining orders are com-
monly abused”); Young, supra note 92 (stating that some feminist activists claim that 
restraining orders are abused by men rather than women).   
 206 Such “statistics” do exist in one form or another, however.  For example, Pro-
fessor Benjamin Foster, Ph.D., CPA, CMA, estimated that 80.6 percent of all of the 
restraining orders issued in Virginia during 2006 were “false or unnecessary.”  Hes-
sion, supra note 1, at 14; see also RADAR SERVS., INC., supra note 201, at 9 (providing 
that, as estimated by Dorothy Wright, a New Jersey attorney and former board mem-
ber of a women’s shelter, forty to fifty percent of restraining orders are requested 
“purely as a legal maneuver”); Young, supra note 92 (quoting Sheara Friend, a Mas-
sachusetts attorney, who estimates that forty to fifty percent of restraining orders are 
strategic ploys).  This Comment expresses no opinion about the trustworthiness of 
such statistics.     
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prove, the potential for abuse inherent in the system (as demonstrated 
in the above discussion) is nonetheless undeniable. 
Those who are contemplating a divorce face the possibility of ex-
tensive legal fees, months or even years of litigation, and an ever-
present awareness that they may not walk away with everything they 
wanted from the divorce.  Many people simply do not have the mon-
ey, time, patience, or moral fortitude to wait to follow the proper le-
gal procedures of divorce.  Furthermore, many divorce proceedings 
are inherently hostile, and the adversarial environment might lead 
someone to commit an illegal act (i.e., file an exaggerated or false pe-
tition) who normally would never have thought to do so.  New Jer-
sey’s domestic-violence law, much like every other such law in the 
country, permits a person to circumvent the lengthy divorce proce-
dures and obtain immediate relief on the same day she fills out the 
application for protection.
207
 
Both men and women alike are subject to the temptation to 
abuse the system—everyone is human and, as such, fallible.
208
  To ar-
gue that, despite the enormous opportunities presented to a would-
be plaintiff, no one would choose to misuse the summary processes 
afforded by the courts is at best naïve and at worst disingenuous.  
Even avid pro-victim groups and feminists admit that abuse occurs, 
but they argue that at most the rate is around five percent of all or-
ders issued.
209
  But even that low estimate (which, like many statistics, 
is likely based on supposition) means that approximately 100,000 de-
fendants nationwide have their liberties unjustly restricted by re-
straining orders every year.
210
  “The highest purpose of law is not to 
punish the guilty, but to protect the innocent.  This must include 
protecting the innocent from the law.”
211
 
The logical conclusion that at least some abuse is inherent with-
in the system is undeniable, and it ignores the fundamental flaws of 
 
 207 See supra Part II.C.1.a (discussing the available relief and the applicable proce-
dures).   
 208 See Young, supra note 201 (stating that men, just like women, have abused re-
straining orders).   
 209 Id. (quoting defenders of domestic-violence laws).     
 210 According to a recent news article, the Justice Department estimates that two 
million restraining orders are issued each year.  Leving & Sacks, supra note 203.  Ap-
plying the conservative estimate of five percent to that number would mean that 
100,000 people each year in the United States are subject to restraining-order abuse.  
In New Jersey alone, 30,000 restraining orders are issued annually.  McCormick & 
Sacks, supra note 203.  Five percent of that number is 1500.     
 211 Corry, supra note 184 (quoting Steven William Rimmer).   
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humanity to argue otherwise.  Thus the focal point of the remaining 
debate between various groups should not be whether the abuse ex-
ists but rather at what rate the abuse of the system occurs.  Even so, 
abuse by unscrupulous plaintiffs is not the only reason for unease as-
sociated with the law.  The legislature and the judiciary must also 
bear their fair share of the responsibility for the current state of do-
mestic-violence actions. 
When a plaintiff alleges an act of domestic violence, some practi-
tioners argue that the system essentially presumes the accused to be 
guilty.  One commentator argues that “[f]acts have become irrele-
vant” and that restraining orders are granted as a matter of course.
212
  
A plausible explanation for this possible phenomenon is the judge’s 
own personal interest in being overly cautious.
213
  If a judge should 
grant a restraining order against someone who might not warrant it, 
the only repercussion is that the defendant might appeal the order.
214
  
If, on the other hand, the judge denies a restraining order and the 
plaintiff is killed or injured the very next day, sour publicity and an 
enraged community may very well ensure that the jurist’s career will 
be both unpleasant and short.
215
  New Jersey case law is full of exam-
ples of trial judges granting outrageous restraining orders based on 
 
 212 Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1018.   
 213 See Russ Bleemer, N.J. Judges Told to Ignore Rights in Abuse TROs, 140 N.J. L.J. 
281, 295 (1995) (quoting a municipal court judge as having said that “[a] newspaper 
headline can be death to a municipal court judge’s career . . . and the prospect of an 
unfavorable newspaper headline is a frightening one.”). 
 214 The issuance of a TRO is immediately appealable for “plenary hearing de no-
vo,” but the same standards would apply to the appellate review as were applied to 
the initial hearing.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(i) (West 2005).  FROs are appealable 
in the same manner as any other order from a New Jersey trial judge.  See N.J. CT. R. 
2:2-3(a)(1) (2009).   
 215 See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295; Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1041.   
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strained, if not ridiculous, allegations.
216
  Other states have noted a 
similar problem of lax standards.
217
 
This possible phenomenon is further explained and supple-
mented by the mandatory training that judges receive on the issue of 
domestic violence.
218
  At one such training session in 1995, the new 
judges were told to think about the unfavorable publicity of an unfor-
tunate result when deciding whether to issue a TRO.
219
  One of the 
instructing judges at this particular session was quoted to have said, 
“Your job is not to become concerned about all the constitutional 
rights of the man you’re violating as you grant a restraining order.  
Throw him out on the street, give him the clothes on his back and tell 
him, ‘See ya’ around.’”
220
  Another judge stated, “If there is any doubt 
in your mind about what to do, you should issue the restraining or-
der.”
221
  These troubling sentiments are further compounded by the 
fact that judges are trained to focus on the legislative findings,
222
 
which are very pro-plaintiff,
223
 when making their decisions. 
These legislative findings declare that “domestic violence is a se-
rious crime against society”
224
 and that it is the “intent of the Legisla-
 
 216 See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1993) (granting a restraining order because the husband told his wife that he did not 
love her and had no sexual feelings toward her); E.K. v. G.K., 575 A.2d 883, 884 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (granting a restraining order on a theory that the defen-
dant’s methods of disciplining the parties’ children adversely impacted the plaintiff 
because these methods differed from the plaintiff’s); Grant v. Wright, 536 A.2d 319, 
320–21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (issuing a restraining order based on the de-
fendant’s acts of slamming a door during an argument with the plaintiff as well as 
later placing the plaintiff’s possessions into a storage locker in her name); see also 
Hession, supra note 1, at 12–13 (stating that a New Mexico judge issued a restraining 
order against David Letterman on a theory that his presence on television harassed 
the plaintiff).      
 217 See, e.g., Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1020.  Examples include a Connecticut 
attorney who argues that the state judges “approach protection orders as ‘a rubber-
stamping exercise’ and that the due process hearings held later ‘are usually a sham.’”  
Id.  Missouri has been accused of having similar problems.  Id.  Massachusetts is ac-
cused of giving the defendant “little credit.”  Id. at 1019.  See also Young, supra note 92 
(discussing similar problems in multiple states).   
 218 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20(b)(2) (West 2005) (requiring judges to be 
trained on domestic-violence issues within ninety days of appointment or transfer as 
well as annually thereafter).    
 219 Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295.  
 220 Id. at 294.    
 221 Id. at 295.    
 222 Id. at 294.    
 223 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005).   
 224 Id.   
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ture to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protec-
tion from abuse the law can provide.”
225
  The legislature stresses that 
the primary duty of police officers is to “protect the victim” and simi-
larly that “it is the responsibility of the courts to protect victims.”
226
  
Many courts cite this “maximum protection” language as a guiding 
principle in their decision-making processes.
227
  These legislative find-
ings and assigned purposes are not the last of the sources of troubling 
laxity, however.  The statute itself is another source of the potential 
for abuse. 
The standard for determining whether to grant a restraining or-
der is a preponderance of the evidence,
228
 the lowest standard availa-
ble in the law.
229
  This burden is applicable not only to violent crimes 
of physical abuse
230
 but also to nonviolent crimes, such as harass-
ment.
231
  In the past “harassment” has been the basis for over forty 
percent of the allegations of abuse in New Jersey.
232
  Other states have 
even higher rates.
233
  Trial judges have granted restraining orders on 
very thin allegations of harassment, such as for one husband telling 
his wife that he did not love her any longer and had no sexual feel-
ings for her,
234
 for another telling his wife that he would “bury” her if 
she sold more marital assets,
235
 and for another threatening to take 
“drastic measures” if she did not pay a bill and then subsequently cut-
 
 225 Id.   
 226 Id.   
 227 See, e.g., Kanaszka v. Kunen, 713 A.2d 565, 567 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); 
M.V. v. J.R.G., 711 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), overruled on other 
grounds by Kanaszka, 713 A.2d 565.   
 228 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005).   
 229 WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13.   
 230 For example, homicide, sexual assault, and assault are enumerated as predi-
cate crimes.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (West 2005).   
 231 § 2C:25-19(a)(13). 
 232 In 2007, allegations of harassment accounted for forty-two percent of all such 
reported offenses.  UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING UNIT, N.J. STATE POLICE, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE OFFENSE REPORT 2 (2007), available at http://www.njsp.org/info/pdf/ 
2007_domestic_violence.pdf (reporting that 30,055 of the 71,901 offenses in the state 
were for alleged harassment).   
 233 For example, in Massachusetts the majority of restraining orders did not in-
volve even an allegation of any physical abuse.  Young, supra note 92.  Many simply 
state that there was yelling during the course of an argument.  Id.    
 234 Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 984, 984–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
 235 Peranio v. Peranio, 654 A.2d 495, 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  The 
court vacated the order because the phrase used in the specific context was insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to constitute harassment.  Id.     
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ting off her phone service.
236
  The appellate division ultimately over-
turned each of these trial-level determinations and vacated the re-
straining orders issued below.
237
  In so doing, the appellate courts li-
mited the widespread use—and possible abuse—of “harassment” as 
the means for obtaining restraining orders by altering the standards 
for that theory.
238
  The New Jersey Legislature, however, is currently 
considering a bill that would even further expand the types of acts 
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a restraining order,
239
 which 
would thus perhaps render the appellate courts’ efforts moot. 
Aside from the concerns already discussed, scholars and com-
mentators have drawn attention to some other, ancillary issues in re-
straining orders.  One author pointed out that the plight of defen-
dants who work at home is yet another concern because a restraining 
order not only evicts them from their homes but also greatly restricts, 
if not destroys, their ability to work.
240
  Other commentators have ar-
gued that restraining orders inject comparatively more hostility and 
conflict into domestic relations and thus have the effect of actually 
increasing the commissions of domestic violence.
241
  Some argue that 
restraining orders do not even serve the limited purpose for which 
they are intended because someone who is determined to kill his 
spouse will likely not care that a judge ordered him not to do so, and 
thus protective orders only serve to protect “victims” who were not in 
any real danger in the first place.
242
  Some further claim that legisla-
tors advance restraining orders not for the sake of the victims but ra-
 
 236 Corrente v. Corrente, 657 A.2d 440, 441 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  
Note, however, that the New Jersey Legislature has proposed making cutting off tele-
phone service grounds for a restraining order.  Gen. Assem. A449, 214th Leg., 2010–
2011 Sess. (N.J. 2010).       
 237 Corrente, 657 A.2d at 444; Peranio, 654 A.2d at 500; Murray v. Murray, 631 A.2d 
984, 991–92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). 
 238 For a discussion of this development in harassment as a theory for domestic 
violence, see generally Tricia M. Lawrence, Note, The Domestic Violence Pendulum: Has 
it Swung Too Far? Are Harassment Charges Now Being Used as a Sword Rather than a 
Shield?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 342 (1998).   
 239 The New Jersey Legislature has proposed making a defendant who impairs the 
plaintiff’s means of communication subject to a restraining order.  Gen. Assem. 
A449. 
 240 Hession, supra note 1, at 16. 
 241 David R. Usher, Restraining Orders Unconstitutional in New Jersey?, 
OPEDNEWS.COM, July 25, 2008, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Restraining-
Orders-Unconst-by-David-R--Usher-080725-854.html (stating that “the vast majority of 
domestic violence occurs after issuance of a restraining order”).   
 242 Young, supra note 92.  
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ther for the sake of a burgeoning, multibillion dollar domestic-
violence industry, upon which countless attorneys, adoption service 
employees, psychologists, therapists, and other related professionals 
rely for their livelihood.
243
 
In sum, domestic-violence restraining orders are particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse by people who might fabricate allegations of domes-
tic violence to gain an advantage in divorce proceedings.  The legisla-
tive laxity of the statute, the temptation provided for unscrupulous 
plaintiffs, the possible overzealousness of the courts, the legislative 
purposes from the legislature, and the pressure from victim-advocate 
groups stack up against defendants and threaten permanently to de-
prive them of their constitutional rights afforded by the Second 
Amendment.
244
 
III. ANALYSIS OF NEW JERSEY’S STATUTE AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
The preceding portions of this Comment discussed how New 
Jersey’s domestic-violence statute affects defendants’ firearm rights 
both in isolation and in conjunction with numerous other laws.  This 
Part first concludes that the Supreme Court will likely adopt nothing 
less than an intermediate-scrutiny level of review for Second Amend-
ment challenges.
245
  Assuming and applying midlevel scrutiny as the 
standard, New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act would 
likely fail a challenge in the courts.
246
 
A. Appropriate Level of Scrutiny for Second Amendment Challenges 
As is the case with all scrutiny of statutes under the U.S. Consti-
tution, one of the first steps is to identify the level of review, because 
the fate of such laws is normally dependent on the standard that the 
courts apply.
247
  In the landmark case of Heller, however, the Supreme 
Court explicitly declined to adopt a standard of review for Second 
Amendment challenges.
248
  The language of the opinion does, never-
 
 243 Usher, supra note 241; see also Hession, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that domes-
tic violence has grown into a multibillion-dollar business in the past thirty years).   
 244 See infra Part III.B.   
 245 See infra Part III.A. 
 246 See infra Part III.B.  
 247 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671–72 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 248 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817–18, 2821 (2008).  The 
Court noted that choosing a standard of review was unnecessary because under any 
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theless, give some insight into how the Court might eventually rule 
on this issue. 
The majority noted that “rational basis” review
249
 is appropriate 
for some instances of judicial review of constitutional issues,
250
 but 
stated the following: 
Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate the extent 
to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, 
be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeo-
pardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.  If 
all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms 
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant 
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, 
and would have no effect.
251
 
Thus assuming that the Court will not choose rational basis as the 
standard of review is appropriate. 
Justice Breyer argued in his dissent that the Court should adopt 
a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether 
the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that 
is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other impor-
tant governmental interests.”
252
  The majority in Heller specifically re-
jected this proposition as being “no constitutional guarantee at all.”
253
 
Undoubtedly, much scholarly debate and litigation will ensue af-
ter Heller, specifically on the appropriate standard of review.  This 
Comment will go no further, however, to dissect the positions of the 
Justices on this issue and will not attempt to make a compelling case 
as to why one particular standard of review should be chosen over 
another.  The Court has stated that both “rational basis” and an “in-
terest-balancing inquiry” are not demanding enough.  Consequently, 
this Comment assumes that the Court will likely either fashion a new 
test or will draw from preexisting doctrine to adopt a test somewhere 
 
of the standards that it could apply to enumerated rights, the law at issue would fail 
constitutional muster.  Id. at 2817–18.   
 249 Under this standard of review, courts will uphold a law if it “bears a reasonable 
relationship to the attainment of some legitimate governmental objective.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (7th ed. 1999).      
 250 The Court stated that these instances include the constitutional command 
against the enforcement of irrational laws.  Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27.   
 251 Id. (citation omitted). 
 252 Id. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting).     
 253 Id. at 2817–18, 2821 (majority opinion).   
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between “intermediate scrutiny” and “strict scrutiny.”
254
  This Com-
ment concludes, however, that even if the Court ultimately chooses 
the lower “intermediate-scrutiny” standard, New Jersey’s Prevention 
of Domestic Violence Act violates defendants’ rights under the 
Second Amendment because the Act is overly broad.
255
 
B. Analysis of New Jersey’s Statute under the Second Amendment 
New Jersey’s Prevention of Domestic Violence Act has been criti-
cized for some time.  Many argue that such statutes are simply lacking 
on policy grounds;
256
 others argue that they are constitutionally in-
firm.
257
  One of the more common objections is that New Jersey’s sta-
tute is actually a prosecution for a crime turned into a civil proceed-
ing.
258
  And in fact, in a recent state case, Crespo v. Crespo, the trial 
judge found the statute violative of both the state and federal consti-
tutions but not on Second Amendment grounds.
259
 
 
 254 For a discussion of these various types of scrutiny, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
247, at 671–73.  For a post-Heller case suggesting that strict scrutiny might be appro-
priate, see United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (“The in-
dividual right to bear arms might well be a fundamental right, the restriction of 
which requires strict scrutiny.  This conclusion is supported by the placement of the 
Second Amendment within the Bill of Rights alongside this Country’s most precious 
freedoms.”).    
 255 See infra Part III.B.   
 256 See, e.g., Sack, supra note 30, at 1676–1721 (describing in general various policy-
related discussions of domestic-violence statutes).   
 257 See, e.g., Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1042 (arguing that the statute has six defi-
ciencies: “lack of notice; the denial of the right of poor defendants to free counsel; 
the denial of the right to take the depositions; the lack of a full evidentiary hearing; 
an improper standard of proof; and, most importantly, the failure to provide a de-
fendant with a trial by jury”).   
 258 See, e.g., Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 7 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. June 18, 2008), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/ 
crespo_decision.pdf (addressing the defendant’s arguments on this point), rev’d, 972 
A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2009); 
Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1009–10 (stating that New Jersey’s law attempts to con-
vert the prosecution for a crime into a civil proceeding).  Interestingly, the New Jer-
sey Appellate Division at one point commented on the fact that the statute requires a 
judge to make a judicial finding that the defendant committed a crime and that the 
court must do so at a standard lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Cesare v. 
Cesare, 694 A.2d 603, 606–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), overruled on other 
grounds by 713 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1998) (overturning the appellate decision on other 
grounds and not addressing this particular issue).  
 259 Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, at 15, 19 (stating that the statute violated the separa-
tion-of-powers principle under the New Jersey Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution).  
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The Supreme Court in Heller declared that the Second Amend-
ment protects an individual right to keep a handgun in the home for 
personal protection.
260
  This right is not absolute, however, as the 
Court noted.
261
  Convicted felons, for example, are roundly regarded 
to have forfeited this right.
262
  But merely because someone is a party 
in a divorce proceeding and has a soon-to-be-ex-spouse who chooses 
to abuse the system, saying that this individual should lose all rights to 
possess weapons, potentially for life, goes too far. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court were even-
tually to apply an “intermediate scrutiny” standard to Second 
Amendment challenges,
263
 then the government would have to justify 
the law by showing the existence of “important” governmental objec-
tives and must meet a “demanding” burden of justification by show-
ing that the law is “substantially related” to the achievement of those 
objectives.
264
  New Jersey’s law, when viewed not only in isolation but 
also in tandem with all of the collateral consequences that befall the 
defendants the law ensnares, is clearly deficient in these regards. 
The “important governmental objective” is the prevention of 
domestic violence.
265
  Few would seriously argue that this is not justifi-
able as such.
266
  Where New Jersey’s law fails constitutional muster, 
however, is the second prong of the analysis: whether the law is “sub-
stantially related” to this objective. 
The laxity of the statute is clearly egregious considering all that 
the defendant stands to lose upon the issuance of an FRO.  Many 
practitioners argue that restraining orders are granted as a matter of 
reflex in many instances.
267
  First, at the ex parte hearing, the judge 
need only be convinced that it “appears that the plaintiff is in danger 
of domestic violence.”
268
  Many of the predicate crimes (e.g., harass-
 
 260 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).   
 261 Id. at 2816–17.     
 262 Id. (assuming the validity of such “longstanding prohibitions”).   
 263 See supra Part III.A. 
 264 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 671; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (7th 
ed. 1999) (defining “intermediate scrutiny”). 
 265 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2005) (“It is therefore, the intent of the 
Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from 
abuse the law can provide.”).   
 266 See id. (finding that domestic violence is a “serious crime against society”).   
 267 See supra Part II.C.3.   
 268 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(g) (West 2005) (emphasis added).   
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ment and terroristic threats)
269
 are so easy to allege and difficult to 
disprove
270
 that the burden on the plaintiff (who testifies without the 
defendant being present)
271
 is virtually nonexistent.
272
  The plaintiff is 
provided with many tempting reasons to embellish, if not completely 
fabricate, the alleged abusive encounter.
273
  Judges are trained and 
encouraged to grant such restraining orders not only as a matter of 
legislatively mandated public policy but also as a matter of personally 
motivated interest in job security.
274
  At this point, the defendant’s 
weapons may be seized under the TRO.
275
 
Within an extremely short period of time
276
 (during which the 
defendant has likely been evicted from his home)
277
 the defendant is 
formally accused of being a domestic abuser by his estranged spouse 
or partner.
278
  While the plaintiff must technically meet the minimal 
burden of a “preponderance of the evidence,”
279
 numerous commen-
tators argue that the defendant is, as a matter of practice, presumed 
to be guilty.
280
  After a summary hearing,
281
 the court (erring on the 
 
 269 Id. § 2C:25-19(a).   
 270 See Lawrence, supra note 238, at 351 (discussing restraining orders based on 
harassment allegations that were later overturned on appeal).     
 271 See § 2C:25-28 (permitting a temporary restraining order to be granted after an 
ex parte hearing).   
 272 See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 294 (stating that judges are encouraged to 
grant every order).   
 273 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (listing the relief available to the 
plaintiff).  Much of this relief permits the plaintiff to receive the benefits of a lengthy 
divorce proceeding simply by alleging that the defendant threatened to physically 
abuse her.  See id.; see also Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1042. 
 274 See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 295 (stating that some judges are motivated by 
the desire to avoid bad publicity that might jeopardize their careers); supra Part 
II.C.3.     
 275 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(j) (West 2005).   
 276 Ten days is the return period for the hearing.  Id. § 2C:25-29(a).   
 277 See § 2C:25-28(j) (permitting the judge to forbid the defendant “from return-
ing to the scene of the domestic violence,” which oftentimes is the home).   
 278 See § 2C:25-29(a).   
 279 Id.   
 280 Elaine Epstein, former president of the Massachusetts Women’s Bar Associa-
tion, stated, “The facts have become irrelevant . . . . Everyone knows that restraining 
orders . . . are granted to virtually all who apply, lest anyone be blamed for an unfor-
tunate result . . . .”  Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1017–18 (quoting Young, supra note 
92); see also Lerner, supra note 184, at 592 (“If a parent is willing to abuse the system, 
it is unlikely the trial court could discover their improper motives in an order of pro-
tection hearing . . . .”); Hession, supra note 1, at 13 (“Courts routinely issue [tempo-
rary] orders on sworn statements like, ‘I just don’t know what he may do,’ or, ‘he has 
a long history of verbal and emotional abuse.’ . . . To some judges, evidence is irrele-
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side of caution) judicially finds him to have committed a criminal 
act,
282
 although no criminal charges have been filed against him and 
no grand jury has issued an indictment.
283
  The judge is then required 
to remove the defendant’s firearm rights
284
 even if no reason warrants 
believing that the defendant might use physical violence against the 
plaintiff.  Furthermore, the court is under no obligation to place any 
sort of time limit on the prohibition.
285
  Should the judge so choose, 
the judge may not only order that the defendant be barred from own-
ing a firearm but also that the defendant be barred from owning any 
item that could be used as a weapon, including possibly family heir-
looms or kitchen knives.
286
  New Jersey’s statute deprives defendants 
of their specifically enumerated Second Amendment rights in a 
summary manner, provides no exception for nonviolent defendants, 
and presumes that the deprivation will last for the rest of the defen-
dant’s life.  As such, it is patently overbroad and constitutionally defi-
cient. 
To add insult to injury, even if the New Jersey Legislature were 
to amend the statute to make the prohibition on gun ownership 
 
vant; they just issue [final restraining] orders.”); Arnold H. Rutkin, From the Editor, 
FAMILY ADVOCATE, Winter 1996, at ii, iii (stating that the issuance of a TRO is a “rub-
ber-stamping exercise” and arguing that subsequent hearings “are usually a sham”); 
Young, supra note 201 (stating that “judges who worry about being perceived as in-
sensitive to women are satisfied with an affirmative reply to ‘Are you afraid of bodily 
harm by the defendant?’” and quoting former Massachusetts state Representative 
Barbara Gray as having said that “judges grant the restraining orders without asking 
too many questions”).   
 281 Depos v. Depos, 704 A.2d 1049, 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (conclud-
ing that the hearings are summary in nature).  These summary hearings are “short 
and concise” and last only a few hours.  Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1015.  Judges 
often make their determinations based on “hunches, gut feelings, intuition, and pre-
conceived notions.”  Id. at 1037.  Notably, “prior bad acts” are admissible into evi-
dence at these proceedings (in contravention of the normal evidentiary rules, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)), and no right to depose the opposing party before the hearing 
exists.  Heleniak, supra note 184, at 1037; see also Depos, 704 A.2d at 1051.   
 282 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005).  Notably, however, some jurisdic-
tions require only a finding that the individual may commit a crime, e.g., ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(E)(1) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. & 5th Special Sess. of the 
49th Leg. (2009)), and thus seek to stop crimes before any criminal attempt is made.  
See also Hession, supra note 1, at 13–16 (describing the consequences of restraining 
orders).   
 283 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 2005).   
 284 § 2C:25-29(b).   
 285 See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 286 Compare § 2C:25-29(b)(16) (granting the court the authority to order the re-
moval of other “weapon[s]”), with id. § 2C:39-1(r) (broadly defining “weapon”).   
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merely permissive upon the issuance of an FRO, the Congress would 
pick up where the state legislature left off with collateral federal con-
sequences.  Federal statutes prevent the defendant from purchasing 
or possessing a weapon
287
 and from even working in an environment 
in which a weapon may be minimally involved
288
 even though the de-
fendant may have no personal contact whatsoever with the weapon.
289
  
If the New Jersey court had granted an exemption to permit a police 
officer or a member of the armed services to carry a firearm while on 
duty, the federal government takes away that permission and thus 
forces the defendant either to resign or transfer.
290
 
The trial court in Emerson found with regard to Texas’s restrain-
ing-order statute “[t]hat such a routine civil order has such extensive 
consequences totally attenuated from divorce proceedings makes the 
statute unconstitutional.”
291
  Retroactive support for this proposition 
comes from the Supreme Court in the closing paragraph of the ma-
jority opinion of Heller: 
 We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this coun-
try, and we take seriously the concerns raised by the many amici 
who believe that prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution.  
The Constitution leaves the [the legislature] a variety of tools for 
combating that problem, including some measures regulating 
handguns.  But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily 
takes certain policy choices off the table.  These include the absolute 
prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the 
home.
292
 
While the Court here was speaking of absolute bans on all weapons 
kept in the home for self-defense, an argument can be made that sim-
ilar logic should apply with respect to a law that, in essence, denies 
the right to armed self-defense to people whose estranged partners 
 
 287 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006).   
 288 § 922(h).   
 289 For examples of this sort of situation, see supra Part II.C.2.b.   
 290 See § 922(g)(8) (prohibiting persons with restraining orders filed against them 
from possessing weapons and not providing an exception for police and military per-
sonnel).   
 291 United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d, 270 
F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).  
 292 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008) (citation omitted) 
(second emphasis added).     
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are using the “gamesmanship of divorce”
293
 to gain an upper hand in 
separation proceedings. 
Further compounding the laxity of the statute itself, the current 
system in New Jersey provides tantalizing incentives for abuse by 
plaintiffs to gain the upper hand in divorce proceedings.
294
  Accord-
ing to numerous practitioners as well as simple logic, plaintiffs conse-
quently abuse the system.
295
  Lax statutory standards and personally 
motivated judicial bias militate toward the issuance of restraining or-
ders based on very thin and sometimes outrageous allegations.
296
  The 
collateral consequences that befall the defendant extend far beyond 
those restrictions listed on the face of the order and may very well 
stay with the defendant for life.
297
  Among these are the stigma of be-
ing labeled a domestic abuser and having one’s name placed in a na-
tional database of registered offenders
298
 for an act for which no in-
dictment was ever issued and on which no jury ever returned a guilty 
verdict.  Thus ensuring that every restraining order issued is fully jus-
tified is all the more imperative. 
The law as currently written encourages false filings with the en-
ticing incentives available in the FRO.
299
  The statute then places on 
the plaintiff the most minimal burden that it can.
300
  Judicial training 
and personal motivation encourage the judges to grant every order 
lest they be blamed for making a mistake.
301
  Upon granting the or-
der, the defendant loses the right to bear arms, presumptively for 
life.
302
  No exception is made for nonviolent defendants.
303
  For all of 
these reasons, the law is patently unreasonable and overbroad.  
Therefore, New Jersey’s statute is not “substantially related” to an 
 
 293 See Kasper, supra note 201, at 290 (stating that protective orders “can also be-
come part of the gamesmanship of divorce”). 
 294 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (listing the remedies available to 
plaintiffs).   
 295 See supra Part II.C.3.  
 296 Id.   
 297 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (2006) (prohibiting those with restraining orders 
filed against them from coming into contact with weapons at their places of employ-
ment). 
 298 See supra note 3.   
 299 See supra Part II.C.3.   
 300 WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13.  This is the burden placed on 
plaintiffs in FRO hearings.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005).   
 301 See supra Part II.C.3.   
 302 See § 2C:25-29 (imposing no statutory limit on restraining orders).    
 303 See § 2C:25-29(b).   
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“important governmental interest” and thus violates the Second 
Amendment. 
In an intermediate-scrutiny analysis, the underinclusiveness and 
overinclusiveness of the law is a factor in deciding constitutionality.
304
  
Numerous other ways exist to meet the societal goal of preventing 
domestic violence that do not run such an incredible risk of ensnar-
ing innocent defendants and depriving them of their Second 
Amendment rights.
305
  The fact that New Jersey could meet these 
goals while still respecting the rights of defendants makes the current 
provisions of the statute all the more unreasonable. 
IV. RECOMMENDED REVISIONS TO NEW JERSEY’S STATUTE 
The government’s goal of preventing domestic violence is cer-
tainly legitimate if not compelling.  When abusive relationships ac-
tually exist, they are justifiably despicable and should be subject to 
criminal prosecution, as with every other crime.  Yet because the goal 
is not only to punish acts of domestic violence but also to prevent 
them,
306
 some further protection beyond mere prosecution for the 
underlying crime is necessary to properly shield actual victims from 
oppression.  But New Jersey’s statute has gone too far and, in so 
doing, has infringed on the Second Amendment rights of individual 
defendants.
307
  Substantial alternatives to the current law exist that 
would properly balance not only the protection interests of the plain-
tiff but also the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
One commentator passively suggests as a possible solution the 
simple abolition of all civil restraining-order statutes.
308
  According to 
that author, when a real need for a protective order exists (i.e., when 
actual assault or threatened assault has occurred), the court likely will 
issue a criminal restraining order after the filing of criminal 
charges.
309
  Nevertheless, complete abolition, while certainly admini-
strable and straightforward, is somewhat extreme.  Public sentiment 
leans toward the provision of some form of extra protection—a fact 
evidenced by the very existence of domestic-violence statutes not only 
 
 304 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 247, at 674.  
 305 See infra Part IV.   
 306 See § 2C:25-18 (“It is therefore, the intent of the Legislature to assure the vic-
tims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can pro-
vide.”).   
 307 See supra Part III.B.   
 308 Hession, supra note 1, at 17.   
 309 Id.   
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in every single state but also at the federal level.
310
  In fact, New Jer-
sey’s statute specifically states that some form of additional legal pro-
tection is needed.
311
  Direct abolition would be not only a legislative 
task of herculean proportion but also perhaps an act of political sui-
cide.  Therefore, an alternative more reasonable than abolition is re-
quired.  That alternative is modification. 
A great many modifications are possible through which New Jer-
sey’s statute could properly balance the Second Amendment rights of 
the defendant with both the individual needs of the plaintiff for pro-
tection and the larger societal interests of discouraging the repre-
hensible behavior of domestic abuse.  The first modification would be 
to make the prohibition on firearm ownership after an FRO is issued 
permissive as opposed to mandatory.
312
  After all, someone may be ha-
rassing or being lewd to the plaintiff (acts that would justify the impo-
sition of a restraining order)
313
 but all of the surrounding circums-
tances could possibly indicate that the plaintiff was not in any physical 
danger from the defendant. 
Alaska’s statute is illustrative of the proposition for conditional 
removal of weapons.  It provides that a court may order the defen-
dant to surrender any firearms “if the court finds that the respondent 
was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the commis-
sion of the domestic violence.”
314
  Many other states have similar pro-
visions that grant courts the power to protect the plaintiff while si-
multaneously recognizing that the defendant has rights at stake as 
well.
315
  To provide additional protection to potential victims, the law 
 
 310 See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 30 (listing all fifty 
states’ restraining-order statutes along with the version enacted by the District of Co-
lumbia).   
 311 See § 2C:25-18 (stating that New Jersey’s law prior to the enactment of the Pre-
vention of Domestic Violence Act was insufficient to deal with domestic violence).   
 312 See id. § 2C:25-29(b) (requiring the judge issuing the FRO to remove the de-
fendant’s gun rights and providing a limited exception for law-enforcement officers 
and military personnel).   
 313 See id. § 2C:25-19(a) (listing lewdness and harassment among the predicate of-
fenses).   
 314 ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st Spe-
cial Sess. of 26th Leg.).   
 315 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(G)(4) (Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. 
& 5th Special Sess. of the 49th Leg. (2009)) (permitting the removal of weapons if 
the court finds that the defendant poses a credible threat to the physical safety of the 
plaintiff); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4006(2-A) (Westlaw through 2009 1st Reg. 
Sess. of 124th Leg.) (permitting the removal of weapons if the incident of abuse in-
volved a firearm or if a heightened risk of immediate abuse exists); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:56 PM 
2010] COMMENT 681 
 
could permit the courts to seize the weapons if the defendant specifi-
cally threatened to use the weapons against the plaintiff even though 
the weapons were not in the defendant’s possession at the time of the 
domestic-violence incident that gave rise to the complaint.  Some re-
quirement, no matter how slight, that the defendant pose a credible 
threat of using a firearm against the plaintiff would keep weapons out 
of the hands of defendants who legitimately threaten the safety of the 
victim but would simultaneously permit nonviolent defendants to re-
tain their constitutional rights.  This modification is more reasonable 
than a mandatory surrender of all weapons by every defendant re-
gardless of whether any reason exists to believe that the defendant 
might use a weapon against the plaintiff. 
Opponents of this first revision would necessarily argue that all 
people against whom restraining orders are issued should have their 
weapons taken away.
316
  After all, the very existence of an FRO might 
tend to indicate that a person is dangerous.  That proposition, how-
ever, is overly broad and unnecessarily binds the courts’ hands from 
dealing with defendants as individuals.  The circumstances may very 
well indicate that a defendant who has been lewd to the plaintiff or 
has harassed the plaintiff with inappropriate phone calls (both of 
 
ANN. ch. 209A, § 3B (West, Westlaw through ch. 19 of 2010 2d Annual Sess.) (condi-
tioning the removal of firearms upon a showing of a substantial likelihood of imme-
diate danger of abuse); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(14)(j) (West, Westlaw through 
2009 Reg. Sess.) (conditioning the removal of firearms upon a finding that the de-
fendant subsequently violated the order while using a firearm); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
40-15-201(2)(f) (Westlaw through 2009 legislation) (permitting the removal of a 
firearm used in the alleged assault); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.031 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 74th Reg. Sess. & 25th Special Sess.) (requiring the court to consider 
three factors in deciding whether to remove the defendant’s weapons); N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 842-a (McKinney, Westlaw through Laws of 2009) (providing a lengthy set of 
conditions for the removal of firearms under varying conditions); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50B-3.1(a) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (conditioning the removal of 
firearms upon the finding of any of four factors); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6107(b) 
(West Supp. 2009) (permitting the removal of firearms if either the abuse involved a 
weapon or an immediate and present danger of abuse exists); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-7-106(2)(d) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Special Sess.) (permitting the court to 
remove the defendant’s weapons if his or her use or possession of firearms may pose 
a serious threat of harm to the victim).   
 316 See, e.g., Editorial, Armed and Dangerous; Domestic Abuse Suspects Shouldn’t Be Able 
to Keep Their Guns, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2009, at A12, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/16/ 
AR2009021601103.html (arguing that Maryland restraining-order suspects should be 
stripped of their gun rights).   
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which would warrant a protective order)
317
 poses no credible threat to 
the physical safety of the plaintiff. 
By analogy, if the logic were to prevail that people with restrain-
ing orders against them should be prohibited from possessing fire-
arms under any circumstances because they are inherently danger-
ous, then surely all those actually convicted of crimes should 
therefore have their gun rights taken away.  After all, those people 
have, by definition, either pled guilty to a crime or have been found 
guilty by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard far more de-
manding than a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
318
  But the law 
does not deprive all people with criminal convictions from possessing 
weapons.  Federal law, for example, permits those with misdemeanor 
convictions or even certain felony convictions (e.g., “business practic-
es” crimes) to possess weapons.
319
  At the very core of that permission 
is the implicit recognition that not all convicted criminals pose a 
threat to the physical safety of others.  Similar logic should apply to 
those with restraining orders filed against them.  The argument that 
all domestic-violence defendants are inherently dangerous is overly 
broad, fatally simplistic, and unduly restrictive and thus gives the 
court no discretion on decisions that affect the constitutional rights 
of defendants. 
The second modification would be to place a presumptive time 
limit on FROs.  Virtually every state in the country places such time 
limits on their orders,
320
 but New Jersey does not.
321
  The result is that 
 
 317 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (West 2005) (listing lewdness and harassment 
among the predicate offenses).   
 318 Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “preponder-
ance of the evidence,” the standard used in civil proceedings), with id. at 1272–73 
(defining “reasonable doubt,” the standard used in criminal proceedings).  
 319 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) (prohibiting firearm ownership by any-
one convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison), with id. § 
921(a)(20) (excluding from the definition of § 922(g)(1) predicate offenses that re-
late to “business practices”).  Thus people convicted of misdemeanor offenses or 
business felonies may still possess firearms under federal law.     
 320 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6306(1) (LEXIS through 2009) (limiting the 
order to one year); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st 
Special Sess.) (providing for a presumptive limit of two years); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-
3(h)(2) (LEXIS through ch. 365 of Jan. 2009 Sess.) (limiting duration of the order 
to three years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) 
(placing a one-year limit on the extension of the temporary protective order); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-21-106(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Gen. Sess.) (placing a one-year limit 
on the protective order); see also sources cited supra note 36.   
 321 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2005) (imposing no statutory limit on re-
straining orders).    
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if either party wishes to vacate the outstanding order, he or she will 
likely need to hire an attorney and then must attend a hearing,
322
 
even though perhaps decades have passed without incident between 
the parties.  This modification would not only free up the courts and 
reduce the legal expenses of the parties but would also place a cap on 
how long a defendant may be deprived of Second Amendment rights 
and thus bring the statute closer to the realm of being a reasonable 
restriction on such liberties.  Support for this amendment additional-
ly derives from post-Heller decisions that, in finding certain restrain-
ing-order statutes constitutional, have relied in part on the existence 
of such time limits.
323
 
A counterargument that opponents to this amendment will like-
ly raise is that the defendant might still pose a threat to the plaintiff 
even after the restraining order expires.  That concern is easily ad-
dressed by permitting the court to extend the restraining order after 
its expiration provided that the court finds that such a threat contin-
ues to exist.  Most states that place time limits on restraining orders 
grant the court such authority.
324
  This amendment thus would con-
tinue to protect victims just as effectively but would place a presump-
tive limit on how long a defendant may be deprived of constitutional 
rights, which would again make the statute more reasonable. 
Third, the standard of proof should be raised above that of a 
mere “preponderance of the evidence,”
325
 the lowest standard of 
 
 322 § 2C:25-29(d).   
 323 See, e.g., United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (E.D. Wis. 2008) 
(taking into account the time limit on the restraining order in finding that the fed-
eral government’s restriction on the defendant’s gun rights based on a Wisconsin 
restraining order was constitutional); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556, 2008 
WL 4534058, at *2–3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding the statute “narrowly crafted” 
to a “compelling governmental interest” and relying in part on the fact that the limi-
tation is a “temporary prohibition”).  
 324 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-205(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (per-
mitting the court to renew the restraining order if the threat of domestic abuse still 
exists); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(d) (West, Westlaw through 2009) (permit-
ting the court to extend the order when necessary); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 
60/220(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.) (permitting the 
extension of the restraining order upon the satisfaction of certain conditions); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (permitting the 
court to extend the order if any of four conditions are met); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
173-B:5(VI) (Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.) (permitting extensions 
for “good cause”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.) 
(allowing for extensions “on proper showing of cause”).   
 325 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2005) (allocating to the plaintiff the 
burden of proving his or her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence).   
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proof that exists in the judicial system.
326
  The trial court in Crespo de-
cided that the standard should be higher because the right to see 
one’s family is a “fundamental right” that should not be deprived on 
the basis of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
327
  The right to bear 
arms is arguably even more fundamental than the right to see one’s 
family because it is specifically protected in the Bill of Rights.  Thus 
the same logic (i.e., apply a higher level of proof before taking away 
the right) should apply to it as to other such rights.  Post-Heller deci-
sions provide support for this proposition.
328
  This higher standard 
would reduce the risk of defendants falling prey to unscrupulous 
plaintiffs and overzealous courts but is still not so high that plaintiffs 
will find it insurmountable. 
Opposition to this third amendment is likely to be fierce.  The 
prevailing argument among victims’-rights advocates is that accusa-
tions of abuse are inherently difficult to prove (or perhaps to dis-
prove, as the case may be), especially when no physical violence is 
present.
329
  To require victims to prove their allegations by a standard 
higher than the lowest allowed by law would be to run the risk that 
true victims would be unable to meet this burden and thus would be 
denied necessary relief.
330
  Although that is certainly a legitimate ar-
gument, it does seem to patently ignore the interests of the defen-
dant.  But another option is available to a legislature that remains 
concerned about victims’ abilities to prove their allegations: apply the 
lower standard of “preponderance of the evidence” to portions of the 
plaintiff’s allegations that would not deprive the defendant of fun-
damental rights (i.e., virtually everything in the petition), and apply 
the higher standard of “clear and convincing evidence” to the con-
sideration of whether the defendant should have any weapons taken 
away.
331
  This alternative revision would permit the plaintiff to obtain 
 
 326 WINTERS & BALDWIN, supra note 75, § 47.13.   
 327 Crespo v. Crespo, No. FV-09-2682-04, slip op. at 17, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
June 18, 2008), available at http://www.mediaradar.org/docs/crespo_decision.pdf, 
rev’d, 972 A.2d 1169 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009), cert. granted, 983 A.2d 196 (N.J. 
2009).   
 328 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008).   
 329 See, e.g., Roe v. Roe, 601 A.2d 1201, 1206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (ex-
pressing these concerns). 
 330 Id.  
 331 See supra notes 312–19 and accompanying text (proposing that the legislature 
set forth a list of factors to satisfy the court that the defendant poses a danger of us-
ing weapons against the plaintiff before the court orders the defendant to forfeit his 
or her firearms).   
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the majority of relief requested and would only place a higher bur-
den on the plaintiff if the plaintiff additionally wished to have the 
court take away the defendant’s guns. 
Arguments that this standard would be difficult to administer are 
weak because the court surely has the institutional competence to dis-
tinguish between the two standards and because a separate finding by 
the judge that the possession of weapons by the defendant poses a 
threat to the plaintiff already requires independent consideration.  
Thus, in actuality, this modification would place no extra burden on 
the court that would not already exist by the adoption of the first 
proposed amendment (i.e., making the removal of weapons condi-
tional on the finding of certain facts).  Such a modification is reason-
able in that it only places an extra onus on plaintiffs who wish to cur-
tail the constitutional rights of the defendant but simultaneously 
prevents the courts from depriving the defendant of Second 
Amendment firearm rights by the lowest standard available in the 
law. 
The fourth alteration would be to combat the temptation for 
abuse by plaintiffs specifically by providing for penalties for false ac-
cusations by either party within the text of the statute.  Many states 
already outline such penalties in their domestic-violence laws.
332
  
While New Jersey already has a general prohibition on perjury among 
its other substantive crimes,
333
 independent prosecution in relation to 
domestic-violence complaints is rare.
334
  By providing for specific pe-
 
 332 For states that expressly give the court the authority to assess costs and fees 
against a party making false statements, see, for example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
202(c)(2) (LEXIS through 2009 Reg. Sess.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/226 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 96-875 of 2009 Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136.1(B) 
(Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02.1 (LEXIS through 
2009 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.2(C)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 
460 of the 1st Reg. Sess. of 52nd Leg.).  For a statute that grants the court authority 
to place such individuals in contempt of court, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
600.2950(24) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.).  For states that make false 
statements punishable as crimes, see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:3(I) (Westlaw 
through Ch. 1 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106(a.1) (West 
2001 & Supp. 2009). 
 333 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(a) (West 2005) (providing that the making of false 
statements under oath is a crime of the third degree).    
 334 See generally Aisling Swift, Collier Courts Consider Perjury Charges for Use of False 
Names, NAPLESNEWS.COM, June 30, 2007, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2007/ 
jun/30/special_report_collier 
_courts_consider_perjury_cha/ (stating that perjury charges are rare in a variety of 
proceedings); Valerie D. Nixon, Perjury: A Very Serious Crime?, TRUTH AND JUSTICE: 
FAMILY COURT REFORM, Oct. 3, 2006, http://truthinscotsthistle.blogspot.com/ 
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nalties outside of criminal prosecution (such as monetary sanctions 
by the court) and by making the parties aware of the consequences 
before the proceeding, a judge (convinced that a particular plaintiff 
is abusing the system) will far more likely actually sanction the indi-
vidual attempting to misuse the judicial process.  Allowing courts to 
sanction either of the parties with monetary fines at the hearings will 
decrease the likelihood that unscrupulous plaintiffs (or defendants, 
for that matter) will go unchecked by the system.  Furthermore, the 
specific knowledge that one could be penalized for a fraudulent filing 
will not only reduce the number of possibly frivolous petitions and 
thus relieve congestion in the courts but will also reduce the risk of 
false testimony at the hearings and thereby serve the fundamental in-
terests of truth and justice. 
Any opposition to this amendment would be on very shaky 
ground in that it would seek to protect those who are abusing the 
judicial system—thereby detracting time and resources that could be 
spent on true victims—and improperly curtailing the liberties of in-
nocent defendants.  Furthermore, permitting the court to issue sanc-
tions against any perjuring party results in an evenhanded application 
of the law.  Granting the court the authority to deal with what it finds 
to be fraudulent filings with immediate monetary sanctions is certain-
ly reasonable to curtail the temptation for abuse of the system by ei-
ther party.  Because it would concomitantly reduce the temptation 
for abuse by plaintiffs, it would thus limit the number of possibly in-
nocent defendants affected by the system and make the statute more 
reasonable. 
Finally, the mandatory yearly training of judges
335
 should be 
modified to bring the constitutional rights of the defendant to the di-
rect consideration of the court.  Judges should not only be aware that 
domestic violence is a societal problem and that they are to provide 
the “maximum protection” to victims that the law can provide,
336
 but 
 
2006_10_01_archive.html (expressing the opinion that perjury in family court often 
goes unaddressed).  Additionally, common sense indicates that many judges would 
honestly believe that a party has lied under oath (or perhaps simply exaggerated the 
truth) based on all of the facts and circumstances but would choose not to take the 
extra step of attempting to bring the declarant up on criminal charges.  The circums-
tances may be sufficient to convince a court of equity of malfeasance but would be 
insufficient for the return of an indictment, let alone an ultimate conviction.         
 335 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20(a)(2) (West 2005) (mandating judicial training 
on domestic-violence issues both within ninety days of appointment or transfer and 
annually thereafter).    
 336 For a discussion of the training required for judges, see supra Part II.C.3.   
SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:56 PM 
2010] COMMENT 687 
 
that they must also be wary of trampling on the constitutional rights 
of defendants.
337
  Additionally, judges should be aware that the system 
has a great potential for abuse and that plaintiffs are provided with 
many incentives to be overly zealous if not unscrupulous in their peti-
tions for protection.
338
  Addressing such concerns during judicial 
training is certainly reasonable in an effort to balance the needs of 
the plaintiff with the rights of the defendant.  Counterarguments to 
this proposed amendment would, in essence, insist that the court on-
ly hear the interests of one side and ignore the other.  Such a posi-
tion is clearly not in line with the interests of equity and justice. 
Notably, however, even if the New Jersey Legislature were to 
adopt all of the aforementioned suggestions for modification, defen-
dants against whom restraining orders are issued would still be sub-
ject to federal curtailment of their gun rights.
339
  A state’s proper pro-
tection of the defendant’s constitutional rights is worthless if the 
federal government immediately takes away that protection.  Conse-
quently, courts and commentators should analyze the federal prohi-
bition on firearm ownership by those with restraining orders filed 
against them to find the proper balance of all of the competing in-
terests. 
One possible solution is to make such restrictions on firearms 
ownership conditioned on factors similar to those in Alaska’s legisla-
tion
340
 or perhaps to provide exceptions for nonviolent defendants.  
Indeed, prohibition on gun ownership by felons under § 922 explicit-
ly provides for a “business crimes” exception and thus permits people 
with such nonviolent criminal histories to own firearms.
341
  After all, 
possession of weapons by those defendants is not the harm that the 
statute is designed to prevent (i.e., keeping guns out of the hands of 
dangerous individuals).  Perhaps in the same spirit, analogous excep-
tions are appropriate where the person against whom a restraining 
order is filed does not represent the danger targeted by the statute 
 
 337 See Bleemer, supra note 213, at 294–95 (noting that some judges have already 
expressed concern about the short shrift that is given to defendants’ constitutional 
rights in such hearings).   
 338 For a discussion of abuse by plaintiffs and such temptations, see supra Part 
II.C.3. 
 339 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006) (prohibiting persons with restraining orders 
filed against them from possessing firearms).   
 340 See ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(7) (LEXIS through 2009 1st Reg. Sess. & 1st 
Special Sess. of 26th Leg.) (defining the conditions under which a court may order 
defendants to surrender their firearms).   
 341 See supra note 319.  
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(i.e., does not pose a threat of using weapons against the plaintiff).  
Whatever the case, the blanket prohibition of the federal law likely 
goes too far, an observation already made by district courts.
342
  Fur-
ther analysis is clearly appropriate in light of Heller.
343
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence is a legitimate societal concern that no one 
should trivialize.  When it occurs, the appropriate response is to take 
it seriously and use the tools afforded by the legislature and the judi-
cial system to correct past incidents and prevent recurrences.  The 
current New Jersey statute, however, is arranged in such a way that it 
provides an enormous incentive for plaintiffs to abuse the process.
344
  
The abuse of civil protection orders not only trivializes the plight of 
true victims of domestic violence, but it also subjects innocent defen-
dants to unwarranted deprivations of their liberties and rights.  
Among these lost liberties is the right to possess firearms.
345
 
The Supreme Court has dramatically altered the understanding 
of the Second Amendment, and a constitutionally protected right for 
the individual to keep and bear arms now exists.
346
  Incorporation of 
this right against the states is not only reasonable but inevitable.
347
  
When this right is applied against the states, many laws will come un-
der scrutiny in an area where they had previously been shielded from 
any judicial review.  Domestic-violence statutes are a prime example 
of laws that affect in a sweeping manner the right of individuals to 
possess guns, and Second Amendment challenges are certain to fol-
 
 342 See, e.g., United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (N.D. Tex. 1999) 
(declaring the federal statute as violative of the Second Amendment), rev’d, 270 F.3d 
203 (5th Cir. 2001).  For post-Heller decisions discussing the issue, see United States v. 
Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021–24 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding constitutional the 
federal gun prohibitions on those subject to restraining orders but relying in part on 
the existence of the limited duration of the state restraining order); United States v. 
Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (D. Me. 2008) (declaring constitutional the federal 
prohibition on those subject to restraining orders from possessing firearms but deal-
ing with the subject in the light of false statements by the defendant in trying to pur-
chase a firearm); United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008) (finding constitutional the federal law prohibiting those with 
domestic-violence convictions from possessing weapons).    
 343 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).   
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 345 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (West 2005) (requiring the court to remove 
the defendant’s weapons upon issuing an FRO).   
 346 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.   
 347 See supra Part II.A.   
SLOCUM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:56 PM 
2010] COMMENT 689 
 
low.  New Jersey’s law in particular is overly broad and violates defen-
dants’ Second Amendment rights by virtue of the laxity of the statute, 
the temptation for abuse by plaintiffs, and the overzealousness of the 
courts.  Overreaction to a legitimate societal concern does not war-
rant the de facto extinction of an enumerated constitutional right.  
The New Jersey Legislature should amend the Prevention of Domes-
tic Violence Act.  Other states and the federal government should fol-
low suit. 
 
